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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
Record No. 3888 
VIRGINIA: 
- In the Clerk's Office of the Supreme Court of Appeals at 
Rfobmond on the 11th day of May, 1951. 
COMMO~-WEA.LTH OF VIRGINIA, 
against 
Appellant, 
BALTIMORE STEAM PACKET COMP ANY, Appellee. 
],rom the State Corporation Commission. 
This is to certify that upon the petition of Commonwealth 
of Virginia an appeal as of right has been awarded by one 
of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
from au order rendered by the State Corporation Commission 
on the 15th day of January, 1951, in the cause therein depend-
ing In Re: .Application of Baltimore Steam Packet Company. 
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RECORD 
APPLICATION OF BALTIMORE STEAM PACKET COM-
P ANY .FOR RI~JVIEW AND CORRECTION OF ASSESS-
MF1NT OF S':PATE FRANCHISE TAXES BASED UPOK 
GROSS RECliJIPTS E1ROM BUSINESS TRANSACTED 
TN VIRGINIA ] 10R YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 
1949. 
To the Honorab]e State Corporation Commission, Richmond, 
Virginia. 
Your petitioner, Baltimore Steam Packet Company, would 
respectfully show : 
1. It is a corporation duly created, organized and existing 
under the laws of the State of Maryland with its principal 
office in the City of Baltimore in said State. 
2. It is the owner and operator of three steamboats, all of 
which are engaged in the transportation of freight and pas-
sengers, two of the same operating daily between the City of 
Tialtimore, Maryland, and the City of Norfolk, Virginia, and 
the other of said steamboats operating between Washington, 
District of Columbia, and the City of Norfolk, Virginia, leav-
ing said terminii on alternate days, all of said steamboats 
stopping at 01d Point, Virginia, for the purpose of receiving 
and discharging freight and passengers. 
3. All three steamboats are duly enrolled and 
page 2 r licensed in conformity to Title L, ''Regulation of 
,Vessels in Domestic Commerce", of the revised 
statntes of the United States and especially in conformity 
with United States Code, Title 46, Sections 253, 259 and 263, 
as will be duly shown by Consolidated Certificates of Enroll-
ment and License issued to each of said steamboats and cur-
rently in effect during the entire period covered by this pe-
tition. The names of the vessels and the dates of their re-
8pective Consolidated Certificates of Enrollment and License 
being as follows : 
"S S CITY OF RICHMOND"-May 28, 1948. 
"S S CITY OF NORJ.i,OLK "-October 14, 1948. 
"S S DISTUI.C'l' OF COLUMBIA"-May 2, 1949. 
As a result of said enrollment and licensing, each of said 
steamboats became and is ships and vessels of the United 
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States and as such is entitled to the privileges secured to such 
ships and vessels by the regulations and Acts of Congress 
aforP-said for enrolling and licensing ships and vessels to be 
employed in the coasting trade. 
4. Virginia Code, 1950, §§58-570, 58-575, 58-576 and 58-577 
provide as follows: 
§fi8-570. Annual ·report.-:mach and every corporation which 
9perates steamships, steamboats or other floating property 
for the transportation of passengers or freight shall report 
annually, on or before the first day of May, to the Commis-
sion, all of its real and personal property of every description 
in this State belonging to it as of the beginning of the first 
day of January preceding, showing particularly in what city, 
town and school district the property is located and classifying 
the sume under the following hea.ds : · 
page 3 ~ "(1) All steamships, steamboats and other float-
ing property, their machinery and equipments; 
'' (2) All wharves, sheds, otlices, stores, docks, machine 
shops, granaries, elevators and other buildings; 
· '' ( 3) All real estate and personal property not included 
in the foregoing classes. 
'' I1]ach such corporation shall also give in such report: 
'' (a) The total number of miles operated within and with-
out this State for the year ending December thirty-first next 
preceding; (b) the gross receipts from operations entirely 
within this State and if operations are partly within and 
partly without this State the entire gross receipts from oper-
.ations for the year ending December thirty-first next preced-
ing: and ( c) any and all other information in such manner 
and in such detail as the Commission shall require. (1928, 
p. ] 52: Tax Code, §221.) '' 
"§58-575. 1'nnual license tax.-Every such company for 
ihe privilege of doing business in this State, in addition to 
the ammal registration fee and property tax, shall pay an an-
_nual State license tax as follows:· 
'' Such tax shall be equal to one and one-half per centum 
upon the gross receipts from operation up to and not in ex-
cess of five hundred thousand dollars and one and three-
fourtl1s per eentum upon such receipts in excess of that amount 
of such companies, and each of them;within this State. 
''W11en such companies are operated partly within and 
partly without this State, the gross receipts within this Stat~ 
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shall be deemed to be all receipts on business beginning· and 
ending· within this State and all receipts earned in this State 
on business passing through, into or out of this State; pro-
vided that unless otherwise clearly shown such last mentioned 
receipts shall he deemed to be that proportion of the total 
receipts from such business which the entire line mileage over 
which the business is done bears to the mileage operated with-
in this State. 
'' The provisions of this section shall apply to the assess-
ment for the tax year nineteen hundred forty-nine and every 
year t11ereafter, until otherwise ordered by law. (1926, p. 
~)55; 1928, p. 154; 1936, p. 534; 1938, p. 412; 1944, p. 110; Tax 
Code, §222; 1948, p. 925.) 
§58-576. Payment of tax.-Such corporation shall 
page 4 ~ pay into the State treasury by the first of October 
following the· taxes assessed against it. (1928, p. 
153 ; Tax Code, §221.) 
"~58-577. Penalty for failure to pay.-Any such corpora-
tion failing to pay such taxes into the State treasury within 
the time herein prescribed shall incur a penalty thereon of 
five per centum, which shall be added to amount of the taxes. 
( 1928, p. 153; Tax Code, §221.) '' 
5. Acting pursuant to the terms of said Virginia Code, 1950, 
§§58-570, 58-575, 58-576, 58-577, this Honorable Commission 
has assessed against your petitioner, in addition to the annual 
registration fee and property tax, for the privilege of oper-
a ting its steamboats on the navigable waters of the United 
Atates and in interstate commerce between the States of 
Maryland and Virginia, during the year 1949 an annual state 
Hcense tax computed on gross receipts as follows: 
Taxe@ 1.5% of $500,000 ............... $ 7,500.00 
Tax @ 1.75% of $658,028.96 . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,515.51 
Total tax ......................... $ 19,015.51 
and has ordered your petitioner to pay said amount to t;tie 
Treasurer of Virginia at Richmond, Virginia, on or before 
OctobP-r l, 1950, upon failure to pay which by said date, your 
petitioner is threatened with a penalty of 5% to be added 
to the amount of said license tax. 
6. Your petitioner r~spectfully represents that the tax so 
computed and sought to be imposed upon it is invalid and 
without force and effect for the reason that said Virginia 
Code, 1950, §~58-570, 58-575, 58-576 and 58-577, as attempted 
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to be applied to your said petitioner, are unconstitutional, 
void a_nd of no effect for the following reasons : 
page 5 ~ Article I, Section Ten, Paragraph .. 3 of the Con-
stitution of theUnite<l States provides that: 
''No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any 
duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace, 
enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or 
with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually in-
vaded. or in such imminent danger as will not admit of de-
lay.'' 
Your petitioner avers that, Congress bas not granted its 
consent to the states to lay any duty of tonnage, the action 
of this Honorable Commission in seeking to impose upon it 
the license tax in question, pursuant _to the above-quoted Sec-
tions of the Vii:ginia Code, is without authority in the premises 
by reason of tlle conflict of said quoted statutes upon whic}l 
it relies for its authority with the Constitution of the Unitep. 
States, as above set out, as a result whereof said action of 
thi~ Honorable Commission is without force and effect. 
Said quoted Sections of the Virginia Code are likewise with-
out force and effect and anv action of this Honorable Com-
mission ::,ought to be. ~xercfsed pursuant thereto is likewise 
nuU and void in that said quoted statutes and any authority 
song·bt to be exercised pursuant thereto, so far as this pe-
titioner is concerned, impedes the free flow of commerce be-
tween the states in contravention of the Constitution of the 
United States, Article I, Section Eight, Paragraphs 1, 2, and 
3, reading as follows: 
.... t 
· "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxe.~, 
dufo~s, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide· for 
th~ common defense and general welfare of the United States; 
but all duties, impost~ nncl excises shall be uniform through.-
out the United States: 
': To borrow money on the credit of the United States; 
"To regular eommerce with foreign nations and among tl1e 
several states, and with the Indian Tribes." 
page 6 ~ As sustaining· the contention of unconstitutionality 
of said statutes and any act or authority sought 
to be done or exerci~ecl pursuant thereto, reference is made 
to a brief memorandum attached hereto. 
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As will be seen, the exemption efijoyed applies as well in the 
oase of domestic ownc1'shi1j as in £01•eig11. It applies equally 
whon the enrolled, licensed vessel is engaged solely in intra-
shi te operation .. The exei11ption f'ront state control arises out 
of the exclushte Federal dominion over navig'ahle waters and 
the power to regulate commerce among the states, sustained 
aild f~t1forced through lo_ng judicial histol'y in which there 
ha.s bee11 no exceptio11. It is urgently hoped that the Com-
n1issiou and its legal advisors will give chte consideration 
to the authorities set out in the memoranthtm. 
7. Sections 30 and 31 of the 'rax Bill, as amended by Acts 
of the General Assembly of 1915, undertook to impose an an-
mm l State license tax equal to one and one-eighth per cent 
ttf)ol1 the gl'oss receipts from the operation of steamship com-
panies within the State, among them your petitioner, Balti-
ltlote Steam Packet Company. Iu an opinion rendered by 
ffrmorubln Chl'istophet B. Ga ri1ett, Assistant .Attorney Gen-
o,t-nl, to, the State Corporation Commission un<ler date of 
~~ptember 28, 1915, it was held that this license tax on steam-
ship companies, in all essentials similar to that under con-
sitlerution, was unconstitutional. The Ai;sistant A ttomey Gen-
cm l's opinion concludes as follows : 
L'The method of taxation adopted by the Leg·islature in 
sodions 30 and 31, set out above, (wbi~h are identical with 
Sections 58-570 and 58-575 ii1 the present case) as 
t>age 7 ~ we Jmve already seem, i11volves, fin;t, the taxation 
of aI1 the property, tangible and intangible, of steam-
hout companies within this State, and, in addition, an annual 
1ic~et1se tax upon the teceipts from business beginning and 
ending in this State; and, in addition, a proportionate license 
tax upon business passing through, into or out of the State, 
R:-titl proportion being based upon the ratio of mileage within 
the Rtate to the entire mileage of the company. 
'' '1_,his svstem of tnxation seems to have been clearly dis-
ttppt·oved in Galveston H. &; S. A. R. Co. v. Tcxa .. -;, 210·u. S. 
217, 52 L. F~d. 1030, and Meyer v. Wells Fargo Co., 223 U. S. 
2!)7, 56 L. Ed. 445, upon the ground that the excise, privilege or 
lieonse ta.x, together with the property tax, amounted to more 
than the ordinary tax upon the cotporation 's property with-
in the State as a going concern. In the latter case, after hold-
ing that the tax was not a p1·operty tax~ the co_urt said that 
as fiH the propert:v and assets were subject to ad valormn 
fa.-,tes, therefore, 'tl1is tax cinmot be an attempt to reach the 
vnlue of what is bv the law to be valued and taxed in a dif-
ferent way. ] t would be difficult to apply to a tax levied in 
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these days the explanation of Ma:ine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 
142 U. S. 217, given in -Galveston v. H. & 8. A. R. Co., 210 U. S. 
226; Flint v. Btone 1'racy Co., 220 U. S. 217, 226, and to sup-
pose ii intended to reach only the additional value given by 
its being a part of a going concern to property already taxed 
in its separate items. There is nothing sufficient to indicate 
such a limitation, and for the reasons given above, on the au-
thority of Fa.-r.qo v. II art, 193 U. S. 490, 48 L. Ed. 761, it is 
plain that the gross receipts from all so1~rces could not have 
been used as a means for estimating the going value of the 
property in the State.' 
"I am, therefore, reluctantly forced to the conclusion that 
sections 30 and 31. of the Tax Bill, as amended by the Acts of 
1915, chapter 141, p. 205, are unconstitutional.'' 
The attention of the Commission is respectfully directed to 
this carefully prepared and exhaustive opinion of its then 
leg·al advisers. 
8. A distinction between an ad valorem tax upon tangible 
. property used in interstate commerce and a license tax upon 
the 01,erator of an instrument engaged in such commerce 
lias loug been recognized. As an illustration, an ad valorem 
· tax levied by the local taxing authority at the home 
pnge 8 ~ port of a vessel engaged in the coasting trade has 
been generally upheld. An ad valorem. tax upon an 
inten;tatc carrier apportioned among the states traversed, de-
terrni11e<l on some equitable basis, has likewise been held valid; 
bnt in no irn;;tauce have we found where a license tax, such 
as that in the present case, has ever been held valid, either 
by the United States Supreme Court or by the Court of any 
state. 
9. Our attention has been called to Ott v. Mississippi Valley 
Bo,r.r,e Line Conipany, 336 U. S. 169, 93 Law Ed. 585, where 
it was held that the commerce clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion docs not preclude the assessment, for local ad valorem 
taxes. of vessels owned hy a carrier engaged in interstate com-
meme and usecl within the taxing state, where such assessment 
is based on the ratio between the total number of miles of 
the carrier's Jines in the state and the total number of miles 
of the entire line. This is simply a recognition of the validity 
of an ad 1Jalorem, tax placed upon instruments engaged in in-
terstate commerce. It upholds an equitable distribution of 
snr.h tax, which has always been considered valid and has no · 
rc.~fe-rence to the principle involved in the instant case where 
the tax sought to he imposed is not an all valore-m tax upon 
hrntrnmcnts engaged in interstate commerce, but which is an 
/ 
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exaction for the exercise of a privilege conferred by the Fed-
eral government as the result of the enrollment and licensing 
or the vessels constituting an instrument of commerce con-
ducted pursuant to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal 
govemment to regulate commerce among the several states as 
well as over all navigable waters. 
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully but earnestly 
urged that the imposition of the license tax involved 
page 9 ~ in this case, in disregard of the uniform adjudi-
cations of the state and federal courts holding such 
an exuction unconstitutional, is unwarranted; and it is there-
fore prayed that said assessment be corrected and that your 
petitioner may be relieved of the license tax sought to be im-
posed. and collected. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BAJ./rIMORE STEA:M PACKET 
_ COMPANY, 
By (S) R. E. DUNN, 
(S) · '1\A.ZE~W-ELL TAYLOR, 
Its President. 
Pier 10, 
Light and Barre Streets, 
Baltimore 2, Maryland. 
Counsel for Baltimore 8team Packet Company, 
509 Citiiens Bank Building, 
Norfolk 10, Virginia. 
Stafo of :Virginia, 
City of Baltimore, to-wit: 
This day personally appeared before me, C. E. Clubb, a 
Notarv Publie in and for the Citv aforesaid in the State of 
:M arrl~md, R. 1~. Dunn, who, aft"er being first duly sworn, 
made oath as follows: 
Tlrnt be is now, and was at all times during the period com-
prised in the foregoing petition, President of Baltimore Steam 
Packet Company, the above-named petitioner, and as such is 
dnly authol'ized to execute this atndavit; that the facts stated 
in said petition are true to the best of his knowledge, infor-
mation and belief that his information is based upon the in-
Commonwealth v .. Baltimore Steam Packet Co. 9 
. vestigation made by him, as President of said Bal-
page 10 ~ timore Steam Packet Company, of the facts set out 
in said petition, and that he believes the statements 
so made by him are true and the ref ore makes this affidavit. 
(S) R. E. DUNN, 
President Baltimore Steam Packet Company. 
GIV.EN under my hand and official seal this 15th day of Sep-
tember, 1950. 
. (Notarial Seal) 
(S} C. E. CLUBB, 
Notary Public . 
My commission expires May 7, 1951. 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing petition was 
on the 21st <lay of September, 1950, duly served on Honorable 
J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General, State Library 
Building, Richmond, Virginia, by enclosing the same in an 
envelope properly addressed, stamped and sealed and de-
posited in the United States Post Office, Norfolk, Virginia, 
by me as counsel for the aforesaid petitioner. 
page 11 ~ 
(S) TAZEWELL TAYLOR. 
APPENDIX 
48 Am. Jur., p. 454 
SHIPPING §651 
"§651. Levy or Exaction by States or Other Local Authori-
ties.-By virtue of an express provision of the Federal Constitu-
tion, no state may, without the consent of Congress, 'levy any 
duty of tonnage.' 5 The prohibition extends to all ships and 
vessels employed in the coasting trade, whether employed in 
commercial intercourse between ports in different states, or be-
5U. S. Const., art.. 1, §10, cl. 2; Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 80 
L. Ed. 215, 56 S. Ct. UJ4; Ouachita M. River Packet Co. v. Ai~en, 121 U.S. 444, 30 L. 
Ed. 976, 7 S. Ct. 907; Huse v. Glover/, 119 U. S. 543, 30 L. Ed. 487, 7 S. Ct .. 313; Inman 
S.S. Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238, 24 L. Ed. 118; Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 
(U. S.) 577, 22 L. Ed. 417; Peete v. Morgan, l9 '\\ all (U. S.) 581, 22 L. Ed. 201; 
Mobile Trade Co. v. Lott, 12 \\ all. (U. S.) 221, 20 L. E<l. 376; Stat.c Tonnage Tax 
Cases (Cox v. /.,ott), 12 Wall. (U. S.) 204, 20 L. Ed. 370; Southern S.S. Co. v. Port-
wardens; 6 Wall. (U. S.) 31, 18 L. Ed. 749; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, (i 
L. Ed. 23. 
"Anno: 27 Am. St. Rep. 557." 
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tv.reen ports in the same state ;6 and it ma~es ilo difference whether 
the ships or vessels ta.xed belong to the citizens of the state which 
}~vies the ta.x or to the citizens of another state.7 It embraces 
all ta.xes and duties regardless of thetr name or form, even though 
not measured by the tonnage of the vessel, which operate to im-
pose ·a charge for the privilege of entering, trading in, lying in, or 
departing from a port, or plying lt1 navigable waters. " 8 
pnge 12 ~ See to the same effect Ha1·,mon v. Oity of Chicago, 
147 U. S. 396, 37 L. Ed. 216. 
~rho fact that the enrolled steamers are only operated intra-
state does not remove the invalidity. See footnote 6 s·upra. 
'l'he citizenship of the owner has no effect. See footnote 7· 
supra. 
rrlrn decisions of state courts are to the same effeet. In 
Jlrere v. Von Schoeler, 47 La. Ann. 324, 27 L. R. A. 414, it 
Was held that a license tax upon cvet·y person engaged in the 
busiiie8s of opei·ating one or more towboats to be graduated 
l10(~ol·dihg to the gt·oss annual receipts of said business as ap-
f)I ietl to a vessel dtily etii-olled and licensed for the coasting 
ti'ade uudei· Section 4321 of the revised statutes of the United 
StateA is u11constitutional. 
St. Louis v. Co#solidated Coal Conipany (Mo.), 51 L. R. A. 
850. is to the same effect. 
A lfoense tax imposed upon the operator of an enrolled 
stoamshi.p, ns in the present case, is equally as invalid as a 
htx imposed directly upon the steamship itself. 
··In Moran v. New Orleans, ll2 U.S. 69, 74 (28:653, 655), 
a lnw of Louisiana authotized the citv of New Orleans to 
levy and collect a license upon all persons pursuing any trade, 
profession, or calling, and to provide for its collection, and 
the council of that city passed an ordinance to establish the 
rate of licenses for professions, callihgs, and other business 
for the year 1880, and, among others, provi_ded that every 
memher of a firm or company, othei· agency, person, or cor-
poration, owning and rtmning tow-boats to and from the Gulf 
of Mexico, should pay a license fee of $500. The owner of 
two steam propellers, n1casuring over one hundred tons, duly 
&"ilfofn'.le Trade Co. v. f,,ott, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 221, 20 L. Ed. 376; State Tonnage Tax 
CaR(~S (Cox v. Lott), 12 Wall. 204, 20 L. Ed. 370." 
711Sta.to Tonnage Tn.x Cases (Cox v. Lott), 12 Wall. (U. S.) 204, 20 L. Ed. 370; 
Southern S.S. Co. v. Portwardens, _6 \Vall. (U. S.) 31, 18 L. Ed. 749. 
"Anno: 27 Am. St. Rep. 556, 557." 
8"Clyde Mallory Line8 v. Alal,ama, 296 U. S. 26"1, 80 L. Ed. 215, 56 S. Ct. 194; 
l(eokuk Northern Linc Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 24 L. Ed. 377; lnn~an S.S. 
(Io. v. 111'.nker, 94 U. S. 238, 24 L. Ed. 118; State Tonnage Tax Cases (Co;r; v. Lott), 
12 Wall. (U.S.) 204, 20 L. Ed. 370." . 
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enrolled and licensed at the port of New Orleans under the 
law of tbe United Stat~s, for the c.oasting trade, employed them 
as tug boats in taking vessels from the sea· up the river to 
New Orleans, and from that port to the sea. The city of New 
Orleans brought an action against him to r~cover 
page 13 ~ the license under the ordinance, and obtained a 
judgment in its favor, which, on appeal, was af-
firmed by tbe supreme court of the state. Being brought 
to this court the judgment was reversed, with directions to 
the court below to dismiss the action of the city. In deciding 
the ease this court, speaking by Mr. Jit.stice Matthews, said 
of the license exacted: 'It is a charge explicitly made as the 
]>rice of the privilege of navigating the Mississippi river be-
tween New Orleans and the Gulf, in the coastwise trade, as 
the eondition on which the state of Louisiana consents that 
the boats of the plaintiff in error may be employed by him 
according to the terms of the license granted under the au-
thority of Congress. The sole occupation sought to be sub-
jected to the tax is that of using and enjoying the license of 
the United States to employ these particular vessels in the 
coasting trade; and the state thus seeks to burden with an 
exaction, fixed at its own pleasure, the very right to which 
tho plaintiff in error is entitled under, and which he derives 
from, the Constitution and laws of the United States. The 
Louisiana statute declares expressly that if he refuses or neg-
lects to pay the license tax imposed upon him for using his 
hoat8 in this way, he shall not he permitted to act under and 
avail himself of the license granted by the United States, but 
may he· enjoined from so doing by judicial process. The con-
flict between the two authorities is direct and express. What 
the one declares may be done ,vithout the tax, the other de-
clares shall not be done excer>t upon payment of the tax. In 
such an opposition, the only-question is, which is the superior 
authol'ity; and reduced to that, it furnishes its own answer." 
(From llannon v. C-ity of Chfoago, 147 U. S. 396, 37 L. Ed. 
216.) 
page 14 ~ CO"M.MON,VEALTH OF VIR.GINIA. 
ST.AT]~ CORPORATION COMMISSION . 
.At Richmond, September 22, 1950. 
CASI~ NO. 10163. 
Application of_ Baltimore Steam Packet Company for review 
of the 1950 assessment of the tax on gross receipts. 
.,, 
12 Supreme CJoiirt of .Appeals of Virginia 
This day caiiic J)altirt10re Ste~ri1 Packet. Company by Taze-
weli Tai7Ior, 509 Citizens Barik Buildiiig, N qrfolk 1 O, Virg_inia, 
its Attorney, and filed its application under §58-672 of the 
(lode for a review ai1d cori~ectio1i of the 1950 tax ou gross re-
ceipts; accordingly 
rr is ORDER]JD: 
( l) Tl.tat a proceeding be ins.tituted, assigned . C°:~:e No. 
HH6:~~ doc~eted and set for hearmg at io A. JVL on .Novem-
Hor 28, 1950, in t)le courtroom of the Commission in the State 
Office. ·Building, Hichmo11d, Virginia ; an~l . 
(2) ~riuit attested copies of this 01;der be sent to Qounsel for 
the Applicant, to the Attoi·1iey General and to the Division of 
.Assessrile1it and Taxation of the Commission. 
A 'frue Copy,-Teste: 
. N. vV. ATKINSON, 
Clerk of the State Corporation Commission. 
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STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION. 
At Richmond, September 27, 1950 
CASE NO. 10163 . 
.AtJplication of Baltimofo Steam Packet Company for review 
of the 1950 assessment of the tax on gross receipts. 
IN ORD.ER that this case mav be heard at the same time 
tls the sii:nilat· application of Norfolk, Baltimore and Caro-
lina Line, focorporated; 
IT IS ORDEH-ED: 
(1) That this ease be continued on the docket from 10 A. :M. 
N overnber 28, 1950, to 10 A. M. December 4, 1950; and 
(2) That attested copies of this order be sent to Tazewell 
Taylor~ 509 Citizens Bank Building, Norfolk 10, Virginia, to 
the Attorney General and to the Division of Assessment and 
Taxation of the Commission. 
A True Copy-Teste : 
N. "\V. ATKINSON, 
Clerk of the State Corporation Commission. 
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page 16 ~ COMMONvVEALTH OF VIRGINIA. 
STATE CORPORATION CO.MMISSION. 
CASE NO. 10163. 
Application of Baltimore Steam Packet Company for review 
of the 1950 assessment of the tax on gross receipts. 
Present: Commissioners-VY. Marshall King (Chairman), 
H. Lester Hooker, Ralph T. Catterall ( Commissioner Cat-
terall Presiding). 
Appearances-Tazewell Taylor, Counsel for Applicant. 
Ronry T. ·wickham, Assistant Attorney General. 
Norman S. F}lliott, Counsel for the Commission. 
Heard December 4, 1950, with Case No. 10168. 
p:1ge 17 ~ Commissioner Catterall: Have you gentlemen 
for the taxpayers agreed on the method of present-
ing the argument t 
}\fr. Taylor: It is my thought that I would open the argu-
ment on behalf of the Baltimore Steam Packet Company and 
then I would be followed bv :Mr. Oast. 
Commissioner Catterall~ You mean that no payment has 
convenient wav. 
Mr. Taylor:· Before proceeding with the argument, there 
are two small matters I would 1ilrn to bring to the Commis-
sion's attention; one arises out of the fact that in accordance 
with the stipulation, called "Stipulation No. 2 ", there was a 
statement made there inadvertently that for the year 1950, 
there had been a payment on account of gross receipts for 
busine8s done in Virgfoia of $2,287.34. That has been a matter 
of discussion between Mr. ·wickham, representing the Com-
monwealth, and myself and that was not paid and I inad-
vertently put that in and I would like the record to show, with 
tl.rn approval of Counsel for the Commonwealth, that that 
sho11Jd be as I have stated. 
Commissioner Catterall: I think that would be the most 
been made on the gross receipts in Virginia. 
pag,?. 18 ~ l\Jr. Taylor: Yes, on items not stipulated. 
Uonunissioner Catterall: On gross receipts¥ 
}fr. Taylor: On gross receipts on business done in Vir-
g1ma. 
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George S. Jenkins. 
Commissioner Oatterall: You have not paid on interstate 
or intrastate for 1950? 
l\,.lr. Tavlor: ~'hat is correct. 
Cornmi~sioner Catterall: So the stipulation will be that 
no payment has been made-
Mr. Taylor: Or in accordance wih the facts that this 
$2,287.39 has not been paid. 
Mr. ·wickham: I would like the record to show that in 
the past the applicant has paid g-ross receipts tax based 
on inirastate commerce. 
Commissioner Catterall: That, of course, would go along 
with the previous correction, Mr. Taylor, that in the past the 
appli,~ant has always nEW.d its tax on gross receipts on reve-
nues derived from in~sfate operations. · 
l\Ir. Tay~nly answer for 1949. 
Commissioner Catterall: It did pay in 19491 
:Mr. Taylor: Yes. 
Commissioner Catterall: The Commonwealth would like 
the stipulation to show that it has been paid con-
page 19 ~ tinuously and we can take judicial notice of our 
records in regard to that. The Commission will 
take judicial notice of its own records to show what tax<='s 
have been paid in the past . 
.Mr. Tavlor: I would like to introduce one witness on a 
very hrief point, if I may. 
Cornmissioner Catterall: Yes, indeed. 
page 20 ~ MR. GEORGE S . .JENKINS, 
a witness introduced on behalf of Petitioners, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv l[r. Tavlor: 
·Q. ].fr. Jenkins, state your name, residence and occupation. 
A. Georp:e S. ,Jenkins, Baltimore, Maryland. I am Auditor 
for the Baltimore Steam Packet Company. 
Q. How long have you occupied that position? 
A. Since 1944. 
Q. Are you familiar with the records and accounting 
methods of the Baltimore Steam Packet Company? 
A. I am. 
Q. Under the law, state ·whether or not the Baltimore Steam 
Packet Company is required to publish its interstate rates Y 
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George S. Jenkins. 
A. Thev are. 
Q. Do you so publish them T 
A. Yes. 
· Q. Aud they are filed pursuant to law with the Interstate 
Commerce Commission? 
.A. Yes. 
page 21 ~ Q. And in those rates, state whether or not they 
include the cost of Etevedoring . 
.A. They do. 
Q . .And that is a substantial amount., is it not? 
.A. It is. 
Q . .And by stevedoring, you mean the receiving: loading 
and discharging of freight f 
.A. Yes, physically handling tl1e freight. · 
Q. In loading at point of origin and unloading at point 
of destination 1 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Oast: I just want to suggest that the facts he stipu-
lated as to the general rates which apply in the· Baltimore 
Steam Packet Company, apply also in the Norfolk, Baltimore 
and Carolina Linc, Incorporated. 
Commissioner Catterall: It will be so stipulated. 
Commissioner 0atterall: 
Q. When you say the published rates include stevedoring 
the published rates are for transportation from 
page 22 ~ one place to another place f · 
A. That is corl'ect, expenses generally. 
Q. You don't mean stevedoring is expressly mentioned in 
the rate? 
A. No. 
By Mr. Taylo.r: 
Q. But it is a component part of your expenset 
A . .Yes. 
Q . .And also a component part of tlie service furnished the 
public? 
A. That is true. 
Witness stood aside . 
.After argument. 
Commissioner Ca tterall: The Commission will take this 
-case under advisement. 
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ST.A.TE CORPORATION COMMISSION 
In the Matter of application of Baltimore Steam Paeket Com-
pany for review and correction of as~essment of State 
franchise taxes based upon gToss receipts from business 
transacted in Virginia for year ending December 31, 1949. 
STIPULATION AND AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is hereby stipulated and agreed that for the purposes of 
determining the right of the State Corporation Commission 
to impose and collect the tax required by Section 58-575 of 
the Code of Virginia and its right to impose and (lollect the 
penalty prescribed by Section 58-577 of the Code of Virginia 
for failure to pay the same, the following are the ultimate 
facts under which the said tax and penalty was sought to be 
imposed and collected, to:wit: 
1. That .said applicant, Baltimore Steam Packet Company, 
is a corpor~tion which was duly created, organized and exist-
ing under the laws of the State of l\faryland, with its prin-
cipal office in the ·City of Baltimore in Raid State, pursuant 
to an Act of the General Assembly of Maryland, passed at the 
December Session, 1839, Chapter 328., and said applicant bas 
been in continuom; enjoyment of the rights thereby granted, 
as extended ·and continued from time to time bv the General 
Assembly of Maryland, up to the present time, and in pur-
suance of the rig·hts thereby granted the said ap-
page 24 ~ plicant is now and has continuously exercised saicl 
rights, which facts arc hereby accepted and treated 
a.s a part of this stipulation, all of which will be shown by 
. copies of the various Acts of thP. Genernl Assembly of the 
State of Maryland granting', extending and ·continuing said 
rig;hts, which are herewith filed collertively as "Exhibit A." 
and to be treated as a. part of this stipulation. 
2. That the said applicant during- the entire period covered 
by this controversy and especially during· the entire year 1949, 
and continuously subsequent thereto up to the present time, 
was the owner and operator of three steamships, all of which 
were and are eng·agcd in the transportation of freight and 
passengers, two of the same operating daily between fhe City 
of Baltimore, Maryland, and the City of Norfolk, Virginia, 
and the other of said steamships operating between Wash-
'ington, District of Columbia., and the City of Norfolk, Vir-
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ginia, the latter steamship leaving said terminii on alternate 
days, all of said steamships stopping at Old Point, Virginia, 
for the purpose of receiving and discharging· freight and pas-
sengers. 
3. All three steainships during the entire period covered 
by this controversy were duly enrolled and licensed in con-
formity to Title L, '' Regulation of Vessels in Domestic Com-
merce," of the revised statute8 of the United States and espe-
cially in conformity with United States Code, Title 46, Chap-
ter 12, as will be duly shown by Consolidated Certificates of . 
Enrolment and License issued to each of said steamships and 
currently in ~ffect during the entire period covered by this 
application, the names of said steamships and the 
page 25 ~ dates of their respective Consolidated Certificates 
of Enrollment and License being as follows: 
- "SS CITY OF RICHMOND"--May 26, 1948 
"SS CITY OF NORFOLK''-October 14, 1948 
"SS DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA"-May 2, 1949 
all of which will be shown by photostatic copies of said Con-
solidated Certificates of Enrollment and License hereto at-
tached collectively as "Exhibit B" and to be treated as a 
part of this stip1{lation. As a result of said enrollment and 
licensing, each of said steamships became and is a ship and 
vessel of the United States and as such entitled to the privi-
leges secured to such ships and ves:;:;els by the reg·ulations and 
Acts of Congress aforesaid for enrolling and licensing ships 
to be employed in the coast_ing trade. · 
4. Acting pursuant to the provisi 'Jns of Sections 58-575, 
58-576 and 58-577 of the Code of Virginia, the State Corpora-
tion Commission has assessed against the applicant, Balti-
more Steam Packet Compm1y,, during the. year 1949, a ta:x. 
computed on the gross receipts of said applicant as follows: 
Tax at 1.5% of $500,000.00 ....................... $ 7,500.00 
Tax at 1.75% of $658,028.96 ...................... 11,515.51 
Total tax .............................. $19,015.51 
and has ordered the applicant, Bnltimore Steam Packet Com-
pany, to pay said amount of $19:015.51 to the Treasurer of 
the State of Virginia at Richmond, Virginia, on or before 
October 1, 1950, upon failure to pay which by said clflte, the 
applicant, Baltimore Steam Pncket Company, is threatened 
with a penalty of 5%, to be added to the total amount of said 
tax, which said amount the applicant, Baltimore S_team 
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Packet Company~ has refused and declined to pay 
page 26 ~ and still does so refuse and decline on the ground 
that Sections 58-575, 58-576 and 58-577 of the Code 
of Virginia, as attempted to he applied to said applicant, 
Baltimore Steam Packet Company, are invalid and without 
force and effect, it heing stipulated and agreed that the 
amount of the tax set forth above has been properly com-
puted in accordance with the provisions of Section 58-575 of 
the Code of Virginia. 
It is further stipulated and agreed that any party to this 
proceeding may, in addition to the herein stipulation and 
agreed statement of facts, introduce such additional relevant 
evidence supplemental thereto as he or it may desire and 
which may be accepted by the State Corporation Commission 
of Virginia. 
It is hereby further stipulated that the agreed facts herein 
contained may be presented to the State Corporation Com 
mission and considered and treated nuder the application and 
the answer thereto, and that either party shall have' the rig·ht 
to appeal from the decision and final judgn1ent of the State 
Corporation Commission, in which event, in the hearing or 
hearings on appeal, this stipulation and agreed statement of 
facts shall have the same force and effect and shall be con-
sidered and be effective to the same extent as if said facts had 
been testified to by qualified witnes$eS duly sworn. 
B_t\.LTIMORE STEAl\I PACKET COM-
P ANY 
By TAZJ~,VELL TAYLOR 
Its .Attorney 
COJ\IUHON.W}JALTH OF VIRGINIA 
Bv HENRY T. ,v1CKHAM 
.. Assistant Attorney General 
October 26, 1950. 
Note: Exhibits mentioned herein have been certified to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
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STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION 
1n the Matter of application of Baltimore Steam Packet Com-
pany for review and correetion of assessment of State 
franchise taxes based upon gross receipts from business 
transacted in Virg·inia for year ending D<~cember 31, 1949. 
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STIPULATION AND AGREED STATEMENT OF 
FACTS NO. 2 . 
. It· is hereby further stipulated and agreed, supplementary 
to the Stipulation and Agreed Statement of Facts hereinbe-
f ore filed, as follows: 
That Baltimore Steam Packet Company for the tax years 
1949 and 1950, respectively, has heen assessed with and pnid, 
in addition to the annual registration fee assessed against i't 
for each year., taxes on the following property located in the 
State of Virginia : 
1949 1950 
Floating equipment used locally at 
Norfolk ( Class 1) 
Structures (Class 2) 
Land (Class 3-A) 
Money on Deposit 
Gross receipts on business done in 
Virginia 
$ 661.00 
37,600.00 
145,981.00 
12,801.49 
2,332.31 
$ 661.00 
37,600.00 
145,981.00 
15,076.08 
2,287.34 
BALTil\f ORE STE.AM PACKET COM-
P ANY 
By TAZE"WELL TAYLOR 
Its Attornev 
COl\fMON'\VEALTH OF VIRGINIA., 
Bv HENRY T. \VICKHAM 
.. Assistant Attorney General 
November 6, 1950. 
page 28 ~ COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION 
At Richmond, January 15, 1951 
Application of Baltimoi·e Steam Packet Oompany For Re-
view of the 1950 As8essment of the Tax on Gross Re-
ceipts. 
CASE NO. 10163. 
ON DECEMBER 4, 1950, came again the applicant by its 
Counsel, and came also the Commonwealth by the Attorney 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
General, and the State Corporation Commission by Norman S. 
Elliott, its Counsel, and the Commission, Chairman King., 
Commissioner Hooker and Commissioner Catterall sitting, 
having considered the application of Baltimore Steam Packet 
Company for review of the 1950 assessment of its annual 
license tax ( sometimes ref erred to as the tax upon its gross 
receipts), the stipulations and a~;reed :=;tatements of facts, 
heretofore filed herein, and having heard the argument of 
Counsel, took time to consider of its opinion herein. 
NOvV, ON THIS DAY, the application herein, the stipula-
tions and agreed statements of facts, filed herein, and the 
argument of Counsel having been fully nnd maturely consid-
ered by the Commission, a majority of the Commission, Com-
missioner Catterall dissenting for the reason that he is of the 
opinion that the assessment of said tax! as heretofore made 
by the Commission, is correct, is of tlie opinion and finds: 
( 1) That the assessment of the annual license tax ( some-
times referred to as the tax on gross receipts) for the year 
1950,, made by the Commission against the Baltimore Steam 
Packet Company, under and pursuant to the provisions of 
Article 7, Chapter 12, Title 58 of the Code of Virginia of 
1950, in the amount of $19,015.51, is excessive; 
(2) That the applicant was and is subject to assessment for 
an annual license tax for the year 1950 under and pursuant 
to said provisions of the Code, in the amount of $34.41; and 
(3) That said assessment. of said annual license tax for the 
year 1950 against applicant, in the amount of $19,015.51, ·to 
the extent that it oxceedR snid corrcr.ted annual 
page 29 ~ license tax of the applicant for the year 1950, in 
the amount. of $:~4.al, to-wit, the sum of $18,981.20, 
should be expunged and cancelled ns an erroneous assessment 
of the license tax of the applicant; accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED: 
(1) That the annual licens<? tax (sometimes referred to as 
the tax on gross receipts) for the year 1950, assessed against 
Baltimore Steam Packet Company, in the amount of $19.,-
015.51, under and pursuant to the provisions of Article 7, 
Chapter 12, Title 58, Code of Virginia of 1950, be and the same 
is hereby, reduced to $34.31, and that said Baltimore Stea:m 
Packet Company, be, and it is hereby, 1·equired to pay said 
license tax in the amount of $~4.31, together with a penaltv 
thereon in the amount of 5%, into the State Treasury; .. 
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. (2) That the difl;erence between the amount of said license 
tax for the year 1950, originally assessed by the Commission, 
and said license tax for said year as herein ascertained and 
assessed, to-wit, the sum of $18,981.20, be, and it is hereby 
expunged and cancelled upon the records of the Commission 
and the Comptroller of the State ; 
(3) That said corrected license tax of said Baltimore Steam 
Packet Company for the year 1950, in the amount of $34.31, 
be, and it is hereby, certified to the Comptroller of the State 
in lieu and in place of the lic.ense tax in the amount of $19,-
015.51, originally assessed by the Commission and now ap-
pearing upon his records; 
(4) That this proceeding he, and it is hereby, dropped from 
the docket and the file herein placed in the file for ended 
causes; and 
( 5) That attested copies hereof be sent to Counsel for the 
applicant, to the Attorney Genera], to the Comptroller and to 
the Director of Public Service Taxation. 
A True Copy 
Teste: 
: .. 
N. V{. ATKINSON 
Clerk of the State Corporation Commission 
• • • • • 
. OPINION: King, Commissioner. 
This is an application by Raltimore StClam Paeket Com-
pany for review and corre~tion of nn a~sesRment of State 
license taxes for the year 1950 bar.:;ecl upon its gross receipts 
from business transacted in Virginia for th(;l year ended De-
cember 31, 1949. The case come~ to us on a stipulation of 
facts and on oral testimony introduced by the applicant. From 
these sources and from the official records of this Commis-
sion the facts will be summarized below. 
The applicant, a l\faryland Corporation. organized pursu-
·ant to an act of the Genera] Assembly of Maryland passed 
at ihe December Session, 1839, has its principal offiee in Bal-
timore. During· the entire year 1.949, and continuouslv since 
tJmt time, the applicant owned and operated three ~steam-
ships (tlJe S. S. City of Richmond, the S. S. City of Norfolk, 
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and the S.S. District of Columbia), all of which were and are 
engaged in the transportation of passengers and freight. 
Two of these ships operate daily between Baltimore, Mary-
land, and Norfolk, Virginia, leaving these termini on alter-
nate days. The other ship operates hetween ·washington, 
D. C. and Norfolk, Virginia, leaving these termini on alter-
nate days. All three said steamships stop at Old Point, Vir-
ginia, for the purpose of receiving and discharging pas-
sengers and freight. 
During the entire period covered hy this controversy, the 
three aforementioned steamships were duly enrolled and li-
censed in conformity with Title 46. Chapter 12, of the United 
States Code, pertaining to the ''Regulation of Ves-
page 31 ~ sels in Domestic Commerce''. As a result of said 
enrollment and licensing, each steamship, became 
and is a ship and vessel of the United States and as such is 
entitled to the privilege secured to such Rhips and vessels by 
the various Federal statutes and regulations for enrolling 
and licensing ships to be employed in the coasting trade. 
For the tax yea rs 1949 and 1950 .. in addition to tlrn annual 
registration fee, the applicant has been assessed on floating 
equipment, structures, ]and and mou(:loy on deposit, all of which 
property is admitted to be located in Virginia and with re-
spect to which no question has been raised here. In addition 
to those taxes, the applicant was asf::(lssed with a tax on gToss 
receipts from business clone entirely in Virginia for the years 
1949 and 1950. The 1949 tax, in the amount of $34.98, has 
been paid and is not here in controversy, and a similar gross 
receipts tax in respect of business begjnning and ending in 
Virginia has been paid by the applicant every year since at 
least 1915. The applicant i$ contesting the assessment of the 
similar tax for 1950, in the amount of $34.41 based on gross 
Teceipts from business beginning and ending in Virginia in 
the amount of $2,287.34 during 1949. That tax was assessed 
pursuant to Section 58-575 of the Code of Virginia (1950). 
A penalty of 5% of that tax has also been assessed against 
the applicant pursuant to the provisions of Section 58-577 of 
the Code because of its failure to pay the tax bv October 1, 
1950. The validity of these assesRments represents the first 
issue in the case. 
In addition to the foregoing tax assessments, a gross re-
ceipts tax for the year 1950 has been assessed against the 
applicant under Section 58-575 of the Code ·with reRpect to its 
gross receipts from its interstate busine~s during 1949. This 
is the principal issue in the case. For the tax year 1950, the 
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l\ssessment was in the llmonnt of $18,981,20 and, since that 
tax- was not paid on or before o~tober 1, 1950, a penalty of 
5% has be~n added to the os$esRrn.(mt, By brhiging this pro-
ceeding, the applicant is bore conte.Rting the validity of the 
assessment of ·the gross receipts tax under Seetion 58-575 on 
· its interstate businQs~ and thQ asse~sment of the 
page 32 } p~nalty under Section 58-677. Th~ parties have 
~tipulated tlmt ''tbe amount of the hr~ set forth 
above has b~·en prop~rly computed in acc:ordance with tbe 
provisions of Section 58-575 of the Code of Vh'ginia". 
Section 53.,.575 levies on every corporation which ope,nite*3 
steamships,, stcumboa.h, or otht:)l' floatin~· property for the 
transpoi·tation of :passengers or froig·ht ~ for th~ privilege of 
doing business in this State, in nddition to the annual regia,. 
tration fee and property tax '' ~ fa\ an annnal State license hi4'' 
measured by a percentage of grosR rt·c~ipt~ from oporation~. 
vVe do not thirik the application &nd validity of this tax is 
subfoct to serious question hi so fur a.sit applies to the gross 
receipts from intra.stat~ busin~ss. 
The tax, based on gross receipts from the intrastate bu~i-
ness, is not a cbarg·e for the use of the navigable waters of the 
United States. It is a clrnrg-e fo:r the privilege of doing· busi-
ness in Virginia in a corporate oapacity, aj1d the applicant 
could av_oid tlle tax if it ,_rcn~ wi.Uing; to forego the advantage 
of doing business in that .form. Sin.r~ the inter~tate con1-
lllerce is not involved, the only quest.ion ia whether the ta,x 
interf~i1es with the Federnl licens~ granted to the applicant to 
operate its ve~scls iJ1 the nnvigabJe water~ of tlie United 
States, '\Ve hold that this; aspec.t or thQ cm,e i~. govemcd by 
the case of New l'ork r;x rel rorncll 8fomnboat O<>°, v. Bohmer, 
235 U. S. 549 (U)15), .and 011 the authority of thnt ca$e we 
l1old the tax of $34.41, together with the 5% penalty, validly 
impO$Cd. 
The next question conr,oms tho validity of the as~(}s~ment 
measured by tlJe gTosA receipts of the applicant from ih; busi-
nes$ in int~rstatc comlnerce. The Virginia portion of the 
gross receipts of the applicflnt from ib inter~tatc bmiiness, 
constituting tbe base of the tax assessment, was determined 
by applying the following· langirnge of SeGtion 58-:575: 
''When such companie~ nr~ opo11ated partly within and 
partly without thi~ State, thr. gTos·'i! receipts within this State 
shall be deemed to he all receipt~ on businos~ b~ginning; and 
. ending within this State and all receipts earned in this State 
on business passing througl1, into or out of this State;. pro-
vicled that unless otherwise clearly shown such last mentioned 
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receipts shall be deemed to be that proportio1_1 of 
page 33 ~ the total receipts from such busim~ss which the en-
tire line mileage over which the business is done 
bears to the mileage operated within this State.'' · 
As above indicated, the parties have stipulated that the 
amount of the assessment has been properly computed pur-
suant to the quoted statutory language. V\7 e are not bound by 
that stipulation in so far as it is a conclusion of law. "vYe 
are asked to construe the legal effect of the facts stipulated, 
not a stipulated conclusion of law.'' Central National Bank 
v. First and Mcrcha.nts National Bank, 171 Va. 289, 314 
(1938); see also 50 Am. Jur. 607 (1944). In any event~ it ap-
pears obvious from the records of this Commission that the 
gross receipts from the applicant's interstate business, used 
as the tax base, were certainly not computed in literal com-
pliance with the statutory provii;;ion. 
No proof has been offered to show that the gross receipts 
earned in Virginia from the applicant's interstate business 
are different from that proportion of total receipts ''deemed 
to be" the Virginia receipts by the statute in the absence of 
such proof. The assessment was based on less than lOOo/o of 
total receipts, but it will he noted that the Rtatute provides 
for an apportionment of tot.al r~ceipts by applying· a fraction 
tbe numerator of which is total mileage and the denominator 
of which is Virginia mileage. Since the total mileage exceeds 
the Virginia mileage, the statutory apportionment factor is 
more than 100%, and the statute, if read literally, would re:.. 
quire the applicant to pay a tax based on more than 100% 
of its gross receipts from all sources, including gross receipts 
from outside Virginia. 
Of course it is possible that tl1e difficulty we find with the 
statutory language is the result of a mistake in drafting. It 
was assumed to he a mistake bv the then Assistant Attornev 
General of Virginia, Christop]}er B. Garnett, when he filed 
an opinion dated SeptemlJer 28. 1915, with this Commission, 
relating· to the application of the gross receipts tax on steam-
~hip companies, for he said tlmt the statute '' evidently trans-
poses the numerator and denominator". 
Thus, the statutory deficiency was clearly pointed 
page 34 } out in tllat official opinion of the ... t\.ssistant Attor-
ney General more than 35 years ago, but the par-
ticular language in question has remained unchanged. 
In view of this history, we do not feel that we are free to· 
rewrite the statute to make it read exactlv opposite to the 
way it does read. Moreover, the statutory apportionment 
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formula is particularly set forth and there is not any justi-
fication, in the abse-µce of proof to rebut the statutory pre-
sumption, for determining g-ross receipts subject to tax in 
any manner different from the method provided by the stat-
ute. Althoug·h there is authority that an unapportioned tax 
need not fall in its entirety if the tax, as assessed! is ''fairly 
apportioned'' to the "business done within the State", see 
Central Greyhound Li.ne.c;, Inc. v. Il1ealey, 334 U. S. 653 
(1948) such an approach -does not represent the law of Vir-
ginia. The Supreme Court of Appeals has, in Commonwealth 
v. P. Lorillard, Inc., 129 Va. 74, 82 (1921), set forth the Vir;. 
ginia rule as follows : · 
0 
'' • • * TaxeA can only he assessed, levied and collected 
in the manner prescribed by express statutory authority. Tax 
assessors have no power to make an asseAsment except in the 
manner prescribed by law, and if the statute prescribes a 
method of assessment which is invalid. the assessor bas not 
power or authority to adopt a method of his own which would 
have been legal if it had been prescribed by the legislature." 
We are not unmindful that the same statutory defect, in 
so far as the apportionment formula is concerned, appears 
also in Section 58-547 of the Code relating to the license tax · 
on express companies, and we have consistently ruled that 
the gross receipts of Ruch companies from operations within 
Virginia are subject to tax even though those operations are 
in interstate commerce. There is, however, a material dif-
f ere nee in the two cases. To some extent before 1912, and 
in any event after 1942, the Virginia proportion of the gross 
receipts from the interstate business of express companies 
has been '' clearlv shown'' to be different from the amount 
arrived at by applying the Rtatutory apportionment formula. 
This is indicated by a memomndum to the Commission dated 
December 14, 1942, signed by Mr. J. C. Masten, 
page 35 ~ First Assistant Assessor, and by a memoranc1um 
dated December 10, 1942, prepared by Mr. H. S. 
Marx, Vice President and General Counsel of the Railway 
Express Agency, which former memorandum is initialed by 
all the then members of this Commission. 
· The clear showing required by the statute has been made 
by the express companies and a·greed to by the Commission. · 
In the case of steamship companies there has not been any 
showing at all to rebut the statutory presumption. 
· As we shall see later, the Commission has not made any 
tax assessments on the interRtate gross receipts of steamship 
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compa.nies, at least since 1915, Oll the biu~is now urged by the 
Commonwealth or on any other basis, so the assessmont may 
not be supported by any previ?us administrative interpre!a .. 
tfon of the statute. Indeed, q111te to the contrary,, the admm.-
istrative intc.rpretation, as we ~hall pQint out below, empports 
the opposite view. . 
,v e conclude that tbe asscs$ment as actually made was not 
made in nccordance wit.h the terms of the ijtatuto and that 
there is not any ju~tiffoation for the asB~ssmout as made. We 
also conclude that had the a!,Sef:;sment been made in accord-
ance with tlle ~tatute, it dearly would be invalid since the 
statute does not provide for a proper apportionment. Ac-
cordingly, theo statute, since it would operate to tax gross 
receipt~.di•pm business operations outsido the State , is in con-
flict with the 14th .Amenchnent to the Constitution of the 
United States. The tax wot1ld bo own more objectionable 
than a tax on unapportioned gTOS$ receipts, and as to the 
latter, Justice Frankfurter has said, ''The tax on the sale 
itself cunnot be diff1j1·entiated from a. direct unapportio11ed 
tax on gross receipts which has been definitely held beyond 
the State taxing power ever since Fargo v. Michi,qan, 121 U. 
S. 230, and Philadelphi~ 8tea111,ship Co. v. Pen,nsylvmiia, 122 
U, S. 326.'' Frcmnwn Y, llewit, 329 U, S. 249, 257 (1946). 
vVe could rest our decision on this gnmnd alone, but we 
also reach the same conclusion by other Qonsiderations of 
perhaps u less technical nature. 
- The .Assistant .Attorney General of Virginia ren-
page 36 ~ dered an opinion dat()d September 28, 1915, in con-
nection with a proceerling· brong·ht by the applicant 
presently befo11e us and fivo otl1e.r steamship companies, all 
of which were cngag~d primarily in intersta.te tran~portation 
of passengers and freight. That prO<!t.'ieding contested the 
constitutionality of Sections 30 and 31 of the Tax Bill, as 
amended by the Acts of 1915, Chapter 141, in li!O far as those 
sections imposed n tux npon the gros$ :rec~iph of those steam-
ship companies. The applicable statutory language in the 
present Section 58-575 is the same as the statutory lang·uage 
considered in 1915, 
In a, long· and well-considered opinion, tho Assistant At-
torney General concluded that he was reluctantly "f(wcecl to 
th~ conclusion that Sections 30 and 31 of the Tax Bill as 
amended by tlw Acts of 1915, Chapter l~l, Page 205 are un-
constitutional." That conc)usion wai, based upon the fact 
that the gross receipt~ tnx wa~ not in lieu of a propei·ty tnx 
and the ref ore could not be supported becauso it constit11ted 
a direct burden on the commerce.. It wa,s reGognized that the 
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State could impo~e a tax upon the intangible property, in-
cluding the g·oing concern value, of the interstate business, but 
it was concluded that the propedy taxP.s levied by Virginia 
on steam ship companies bad fully usurped that field. "As 
the scheme provides for both taxation on property and a 
license or occupation tax, it can hardly be claimed that the 
license tax can be justified on the ground of being a com-
. mutation.'' 
We do not feel that it is necessary to re-examine the au-
thorities on which the 1915 opinion· was based. The Com-
monwealth does not seriously argue that t]Je 1'915 opinion was 
,
1
.rrong but rather that more recent constitutional opinions of 
the Supreme Court of the United States would result in a 
different conclusion if the matter ,vere reconsidered today. 
We do not believe, however, that the matter is as simple as 
that. The interpretation of our statutes-the Virginia Stat-
ute here in question-should not be subject to change every 
time a new Justice is appointed to the Supreme Court of the 
United States. Section 58-575 of the Code, and the similar 
statutory provisions preceding it, have been inter-
page 37 ~ preted and administered uniformly for more than 
· 35 years, and we do not believe it is our proper 
function to change that uniform interpretation. 
After the Commission received U1e opinion of the Assistant 
Attorney General in 1915, a further hearing was held to con-
sider the whole problem. The ful] Commission decided that 
the tax was imposed for the privilege of doing busines!:3 in 
Virginia and that it could not be interpreted to be a tax in 
lieu of any legitimate property tax. As suc-h, the tax could 
not be levied against tbe gToss rer.eipts from interstate com-
merce, even though properly apportioned., becam;e Virginia 
does not have the right to withhold permis~ion to do business 
in interstate commerce. 
The interpretation of the statute by the Commission, as 
indicated above, is confirmed by a letter dated August 24, 
1916, from D. Lawrence Groner, then Counsel for the appli-
cant now before us. That letter~ speaking of the 1916 tax re-
turn, says that "We have not included tlu~ earnings on inter-
state business because of the decision of the Commission on 
that subject last year." Again, in a letter dated July 6, 1916, 
received from the Presid<mt of the Clyde Steamship Company, 
it is stated: "You will note we have not filled out the state-
ment of receipts as we understand that inasmuch as the Clyde 
S. S. Co., a Maine Corporation, does not carry on any intra-
state business in Virp:inia it cannot be taxed for the privi-
lege of doing· business in Virginia and is not required to make 
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any return of receipts from any_ interstate busines~ ,ffc. * * ." 
It is apparent from the foregomg that the Comm1ss10n. de-
cided in 1915 that it would tax the intrastate gross receipts 
of steam companies but that it would not tax the interstate 
gross receipts of these companies. Tlw steamship companies 
obviously acquiesced in this administrative policy for they 
were taxed on that basis from 1915 until 1950. 
The Honorable Robert R. Prentis was Chairman of the 
Commission when the administrative policy was adopted, as 
outlined above. ·when he re:dg11ed from the Commission the 
following year ( 1.916) to accept appointment to the 
page 38 ~ Supreme Court of Appeals, he was succeeded as 
Chairman of the Commision by the Honorable 
Christopher B. Garnett who had, in the previous year, g·iven 
the opinion referred to ahove on the same problem as that 
now before us. For that mattel'., from 1915 through 1950 the 
taxes on steamship companies were assessed and paid in this 
manner, and it was not until the Honorable· Ralph T. Cat-
terall became a member of the Commission and was placed in 
charge of taxation that an attempt was made to clmnge the 
administrative policy. Every other member of this Commis-
sion from 1916 to the present time has supported the admin-
istrative policy established by the Commission in 1915. 
Under these circumstances we believe that there should be 
accorded '' great wei_ght to the long standing customs and 
practices which have prevailed and which have not hereto-
fore been challenged", particularly uncfor circumstances 
where '' This long standing practice hns been well- known over 
the years", City of Richmond v. Commorvwealth, 188 Va. 600, 
622, 627 (1948). .As the Supreme Court of Appeals said in 
Atlantic <f D. R. Co. v. Lvons, 101 Va. l, 11 (1902), quoting 
from Smith v. Bryan, Mayor, 100 Va. 19'9 (1902): 
'' The practical construction given to a statute by .public 
officials, and acted upon by the people, is not only to be con-
_sidered but in cases of doubt will be regarded as decisive. 
It is allowed the same effect as a course of judicial decision. 
The Legislature is presumed to be cognizant of such con-
struction, and, when long· continued, in the absence of legis-
lation evincing a dissent, the courts will adopt that construc-
tion.'' 
The same rule is recog·nized by the ·supreme Court of the 
United States. In Prcn,ost Y. Un-ited States, 269 U. S. 443, 
.458 (1926), Mr. Justice Stone said: 
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"• • * the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1918 without 
material change of the provision h1 question must, we think, 
be taken as indicating a purpose to continue in force the ex-
isting law as interpreted by the .Attorney General • • •." 
It is idle to suggest, we think, that perhaps it might have 
been possible to interpret Section 58-575 as imposing a tax 
in lieu of property taxes or to interpret .the tax as a charge 
for various local benefits that are furnished steamship com-
panies by the State of Virginia. It is beside the point to say 
that if the statute were so interpreted it would be 
page 39 ~ a. valid exercise of the taxing power of th<"! State. 
Had the statute heen so interpreted it would not 
be necessary to search for lang·imge in the recent ~plit deci-
sions in the Supreme Court of the United States to support 
it. The statute would have been valid from its inception . 
. Mai11,e v. Granrl Trunk Railway Go., 142 U. S. 217 (1891); 
Postal Telegrn11h Cable Co. v . .Adams, 155 U. S. 688 (1895). 
We may also agree with the Commonwealth that Virginia 
may levy a tax analogous to the one before us if the tax were 
made to apply to a proper subject of taxation of this kind. 
Whether it would be wise to impose such a tax is, of course, 
for tho General Assembly to rletermine but we may note iu 
passing that in 1915, when the g1,oss receipts tax on steam-
s11ip companies .first came before the Commission, tl1ere were 
some twenty-five steamship compm1ies operating· in Virg-inia 
and today there are only two. I~conomic attrition has been 
severe even in the a hsence of an applicable gross receipts 
tax. 
'\Ve hold, then, that Section 58-575 means what it says. The 
tax is levied on the privilege of doing business in Virginia 
and on that alone. It iR not levied in lieu of property taxes 
and it is not a charge for ineide.ntal local benefits. Nashville, 
etc. Railway v. Brml'ning, 310 U. S. 362, 369 (1940). It is a 
charg·e on the privileg·e of carrying on the business, and where 
tlmt business is interstate commerce the tax cannot be sup-
ported. Unlike the business involved in Interstate Oil Pipe 
Line Co11ivany v .. 8fonr, 337 U. S. 662 (1949)~ the business of 
the applicant is carried on, in part, outside of this State. A 
tax on g·ross receipts for the privilege of engaging in that 
business must fall. "JJ,forn1Jhis Natural Gas 00'1npany v. Stone, 
335 u. s. 80 (1948). , 
For the reasons stated herein, the Commission entered the 
order of January 15, 1951, dee~ing it to be just and right 
under all the circumstances of this case. 
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Hooker, Commissione!, concurs. 
• • • • 
page 119 ~ 
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Catterall, Cha.inna:n, dissenting: 
Article 7 of Chapter 12 of Title 58 of the Code of 1950 im-
poses taxes on steamship companies. The section of that 
Article here invoived reads as follows : 
"§58~575. Annual license tax.-Every such company for 
the privilege of doing business in this State, in addition to 
the annual registration fee a~d property tax, shall pay an 
annual State license tax as follows: 
'' Such tax shall be equal to one and one-half per centum 
upon the gross receipts from operation up to and not in excess 
of five hundred thousand dollars and one and three-fourths 
per centum upon such receipts in excess of that amount of 
snch companies, and each of them, within this State. 
"vVhen such companies are operated partly within and 
partly without this State, the gross receipts within this State 
shall he deemed to be all receipts on business beginning and 
ending within this State and all receipts earned in this State 
on business passing through, into or out of this State; pro-
vided that unless otherwise clearlv shown such last mentioned 
receipts shall be deemed to be that proportion of the total 
receipts from such business which the entire line mileage over 
which the business is done bears to the mileage operated with-
in thiR State. 
•'The provisions of this section shall apply to the assess-
ment for the tax year nineteen hundred forty-nine and every 
tax year thereafter, until otherwise ordered by law.'·' 
The tax complained of was assessed in accordance with the 
provisions of this section. There is no controversy over the 
amount of the tax, and the taxpayer does not contend that 
tht' statute does not purport to impose the tax. Its sole con-
tention is that §58-575 is unconstitutional. 
rl'he predecessor <;>f §58-575 was enacted by the General As-
sembly in 1915. At that time the Hon. Christopher B. Gar-
nett was assistant attorney general, and he advised the State 
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Corporation Commission that the tax was unconstitutional be-
cnn!:le iu conflict with the commerce clause of the federal con-
stitution. The following year he became a member of the 
State Corporation Commission. 
page J 20 ~ E,or the thirty-five vears between 1915 and 1950 
the Commission has assessed the tax on '' all re-
ceipts 011 business beginning and ending within this State", 
bnt lms not assessed the tax on '' all receipts earned in this 
State on business passing through, into or out of the State". 
1.'bm;, the administrative construction has been that the tax 
measured by gross receipts earned in this State on business . 
pussiug through, into or out of this State is unconstitutional. 
The General Assembly has not acquiesced in this adminis-
trc1tivc construction. It re-enacted the law in 1948 by Acts 
of Hl48, p. 924, and it re-enacted the law by adopting the Code 
of 1950. The clause held unconstitutional bv the Commission 
is i,tiJl in the statute. This amounts to a declaration by the 
legislature that, in its opinion, the clause is constitutional and 
· should be enforced. rrhe re-enactment of a law previously 
11eld unconstitutional cannot be construed as approval of the 
holding, hut must be construed as a directive· to re-examine 
tlw previous decision aud uphold the constitutionality of the 
law if possible. 
In my opinion, the tax is constitutional. It is a tax on going 
concern value. Going concern value is property, and the value 
of that property is measured by the gross receipts. It _is, 
the ref ore, an ad valo-reim property tax. 
'l1h·~ worst thing that can be said against the constitution-
a.litv of this tax is that the statute calls it an '' annual license 
ta:x;,. Calling it a license tax does not make it a license tax 
any more than calling it a poll tax would make it a poll tax. 
In Dawson v. Kentiwky Distilleries &; lVarehoiise Co., 255 
U. S. 288, 65 L. Ed. 638, the statute imposed what it called 
an "annual license tax", and the court held that it was a 
property tax, saying (p; 292): 
'' The name hv which the tax is described in the statute 
is, of course, iminaterial. '' 
Tbe court also said (p. 292) : 
'' The question is one of local law, so that a decision of it by 
the highest court of the state would be accepted by us as 
conclusive.'' 
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pnge 121 r A license tax is one that has to be paid as a 
· condition precedent to doing something. For ex-
ample, you are not allowed to drive an automobile on the public 
highways without first putting license pla~es on it. rrhe st~te, 
if it wanted to, could stop every automobile at the state hne 
and make it buy. state license plates before proceeding. Hen-
drick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 59 L. Ed. 385; Kane v. New 
,Jersey, 242 .U. S. 160, 61 L. lUd. 222. But a state may not 
stop at its border a vessel licensed by the United States and 
1·et1ufre it to purchase a state license for the privilege of con-
. tiimiug its voyage. The state may not forbid what the federal 
license permits. Thus, in Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U.S. 69, 
28 L. Ji~d. 653, a state statute authorized the city: 
'' To levy, impose and collect a license upon all persons pur-
suing any trade, profession or calling, and to provide for 
it~ collection; and said license shall not be construed to be a 
tax on property.'' 
The statute authorized any court of competent jurisdiction 
to enjoin the carrying on of business without a license. In 
holding that the owner of vessels duly enrolled and licensed 
under the laws of the United States to engage in the coasting 
trade could not be required to pay this tax, the court said 
(p. 75): 
"The Louisiana statute declares expressly that if he re-
fnseR or neglects to pay the license tax imposed upon him, for 
using his boats in this way, he shall not be permitted to act 
under and avail himself of the license granted by the United 
States but may be enjoined from so doing by judicial process. 
The conflict between the two authorities is direct and ex-
press.'' 
A vessel enrolled in the coasting trade is entitled to enter 
any port of the United States whether it is engag·ed in inter-
state commerce or solely in intrastate commerce, and any state 
statute that forbids it to enter any port in the state is void. 
If, therefore, §57-575 means that an enrolled vessel cannot 
enter a state port without a state license, it is void not only as 
to interstate commerce but also as to intrastate comm~rce. 
Now it is obvious that §58-575 does not mean that a vessel 
is required to pay the tax as a condition of navigating or of 
entering a port. This taxpayer has been paying 
page 122 ~ the tax measured by'' all receipts on business be-
ginning and ending in this State'' for thirty-five 
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yea.rs and has never been issued a license by the State. If the 
tax is not paid the State will collect it by an ordinary law-
suit. It will not seek to forbid the vessels to operate. §§58-635 
.anil 58-642 provide that a motor carrier who £ails to pay his 
road taxes can be for bidden to use the roads. There is no 
similar provision of lm,r applicable to water carriers. 
~58-243, concerning licenses generally, provides : 
"Upon the receipt of every application £or a license, the 
commh\sioner of the revenue, if satisfied of its correctness, · 
sht-lll compute the tax prescribed, by law and shall issue a 
lic·ern,e to the applicant to prosecute the business, employ-
ment or profeRsion named in the application, • • • . " 
Nothing like that is done in the case of steamboats. The 
State docs not issue a license to steamboats or claim the right 
to do so. 
§58-239 provides: 
"vVhenever a license is specially required by law and when-
ever the General Assembly shall levy a license tax on any 
husineRs, employment or profession, it shall be unlawful with-
out a license to engage in such business, employment or pro-
fession.'' 
'rhat section is the first section of Chapter 7 of Title 58 
and applies to the licenses provided for by that chapter. It 
does not apply to steamboats and has never been applied to 
steamboats. If it should be thought that, broadly interpreted, 
it con]d app]y to steamboats~ the last sentence of §153 of 
the Constitution would keep it from applying to steamboats. 
That :,en tence says : · 
'"rhe provisions of this article shall always be so restricted 
in theil' application as not to conflict with any 0£ the pro-
vif-iions of the Constitution of the United States, and as if the 
necessary limitations upon their interpretation had been here-
in expressed in each case.'' 
This rule of interpretation applies to all acts of the legis-
lature as well as to the article of the Constitution in which 
it is expressed. A. C. L. R. Co. v. Comm., 136 Va. 134, 143, 
144. 
The so-called license tax on steamship lines is not a license 
fax: but an ad valorem property tax. 
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In Richrnond v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 600, 
page 123 ~ the court pointed out that the Virginia taxes on 
public service companies have been developed 
from the system prescribed for assessing the properties of 
railroad companies. At page 613 the court, speaking of a 
power company, said: 
'• Since the existing method of assessing the properties of 
the appellee company was developed from the system pre-
scrih~il for assessing the properties of railroad companies 
we will give our attention first to the origin and expansion 
of the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the 
taxation-.of railroads.'' 
Ancl at page 619, quoting from the opinion of the Commis-
sion, the court said: 
'· 'A consideration of the constitutional and statutory pro-
visions which govern the assessment of the properties of pub-
lic service corporations will reveal that a uniform plan for the 
assessment and taxation of public service companies has been 
evolvetl * ,. • . ' '' 
The court, in the same case, makes it clear that the fran-
chise taxes levied by the State on public service companies 
iue taxes levied on the value of the franchise. A tax levied on 
pt·operty and measured by its value is, of course, not a license 
tax, but an ad valoreni property tax. 
At page 619, continuing to quote from the Commission's 
opinion," the court said : 
'' The coi1stitutional and statutory provisions, providing for 
this dual method of taxing such companies, uniformly require 
that the Commission, in making the assessments or fixing the 
valuations of the tangible properties, must exclude such fran-
chise value as may be inherent in such property." · 
Jn other words, the localities tax the value o-" the "bare 
bones'' of the property and the State taxes the franchise 
value or "going concern" value of the same property. This 
h dual method" does not mean that the same value is taxed 
twice. It means that two different parts of the whole value 
of the property are each taxed once. The property of a going 
concern has two kinds of value : the '' bare bones'' value of 
each separate item of inert property and the going concern 
value of tlrn property as a whole. 
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At page 623, the court, quoting from Judge Prentis, said: 
})age 1:24 ~ '' 'It will be noted that in assessing these prop-
erties the Commission is expressly forbidden by 
the Constitution to include any franchise value in the assess-
ment of the .physical properties for taxation.' " 
At page 624, the court, quoting from Judge Epes, said: 
" 'The value of these physical properties * * • is the actual 
vnhw ~ • ~ of the land and other physical properties of the 
railroad company exclusive of any franchise value, good will, 
"going concern value", "cost of establishing the business", 
or other "intangible" value of the company.' " 
'rhe franchise taxes on railroads, power companies, steam-
ship lines and other public utilities follow this pattern. 
v\:liether the tax is called a franchise tax or a privilege tax 
or a Jjccnse tax is not material. lfor convenience of reference 
it lrns to be given a name to distinguish it from the local taxes 
on the local property. In its essence it is a tax on the going 
conrern value of the utility's property in Virginia. 
As said by the court in the Richmond tax case, s1ipra, these 
taxes were developed from the system established for the tax-
ation of railroads. That svstem of taxation was embodied in 
the Constitution of 1902. · The framers of that constitution, 
in order to make sure that the Virginia system did not violate 
the federal constitution, copied the Maine system that had 
been held constitutional by-the Supreme Court of the United 
States in 1891. in Mavne v. Grand .Trnnk Railway, 142 U. S. 
217. 35 L. 'FJd. 9!J4. At page 2G71 of the 1.902 Constitutional 
Dclmtes, Mr. Meredith said: "That language is used in the 
lfaine statute, which has received the construction of the 
Supreme Court in 142nd United States Reports.'' 
':tihe following language of the Virginia constitution was dis-
cussed, also at page 2671: 
'' 
411 
i * from the sum so ascertained there may be deducted 
a reasonable sum because of any excess of value 9f the ter-
minal facilties or other similar advantages situated in other 
States over similar facilities or advantages situated in this 
Rtate." 
l\Ir. Meredith said: '' In treating this we had to be very 
carefui because we knew we had to run the risk of a contest 
in the United States Courts. We took the :M:aine statute as 
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far as we could and added to it this provision be-
page J.25 ~ cause the courts haYe recognized that in ascer-
taining the gross receipts per mile, the boards 
must he allowed to take into consideration the extra facili-
ties in other States.'' 
The quoted language now appears in Section 178 of the 
Constitution and §58-520 of the Code. The special signili-
ctm·ce · of that language is that it emphasizes the fact that the 
g1·oss i·eceipts tax is a property tax. The tax is on the going 
concern value of the property in Virginia, and the value of 
that property is measured by the gross receipts earned on 
Virginia mileage. The formula for ascertaining the value 
of the part of the going concern that lies in Virginia pre-
sumes that the value is distributed equally over each mile 
of line. That presumption can be rebutted by proof that the 
part of the property in other states is more valuable per 
mile than the part in Virginia. This provision for weighing 
property values in other states against property values in 
Virginia makes it certain that the tax is in fact a tax on prop-
erty measured by its value. The corresponding provision in 
the steamship tax law is contained in the proviso in the third 
paragraph of §58-575: 
" " :jl! * provided that unless otherwise clearly shown such 
last mentioned receipts shall be deemed to be that proportion 
of the total receipts from such business which the entire line 
mileage over which the business is done bears to the mileage 
operated within this State.'' 
The localities tax the '' bare bones'' of the physical prop-
e1·ty, and the State taxes the "'going concern" value, which 
vulue is measured by the gross receipts apportioned to the 
Virginia mileage. In its 1941 Annual Report at page 41, the 
Commission points out that the franchise tax is a tax on going 
concern value. ,T udg·e Ozlin there said: 
''FRANCHISE VALUE EXCLUDED. 
"It must be borne in mind that, in assessing the physical 
properties of railroads for taxation, the franchise value is 
excluded. This is so by express constitutional mandate. The 
franchise is taxed separately by the State, and based upon 
the gToss receipts of the company. This franchise includes 
the vnlue of tlie charter or privilege of doing business, that 
is, the value of the privilege of serving the particular com-
munity being served, or the value of being first in possession 
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of th,~. pai'ticular location, the good ,vill of the htisi:hess already 
established, the patronage already secured, the value of all 
. . existi,ng contracts; and an th9se values which are 
page ] 26 ~ usuaJly coniprehended in the tei'in, 'going concern 
value.' 
'~ The ref ore, in making. the assessment of the physical prop-
<1 l'ties, w~ are assessi~g tlie t_racks, ti·ack sthictures, cuts, fills, 
ftini1els, _bridges, and the like, or; in othei' words, the bare 
hc~11es of t,he property, de~uded of the ihtangi~le elements 
of va1ue which mav be attflbhtable to them. It should also be 
borne in mind that the franchise value is assessed at 100%.'' 
. In JI ai·ite v. Grand Tru11k, the court. bel¢1 the tax constitu-. 
tional a,1c1 disti,i!]:uished the case .of Pfiiladelphia S; S. Co. v. 
Pe-n1n.svlva1Ha, 122 U. S. 326, 30 L. :md. 1200. Of the Maine 
tax, the court said (142 U. S. at p. 229): 
'' 'l~i-.eie _is no ievy by the statute ,on the receipts themselves, 
e,itlie1· ih form 01· fact; they constitute, a~ said above, ~imply 
the rneans of ascertaining the value of. the pi'ivilege con-
fen·ed. '' 
Of the Pennsylvania tax, the court said: 
'' That was the case of a tax, in terms, upon .the gross re-
ceipts ·of a st~mnship company, incorporated under the laws 
of the State, derived froin the transportation of persons and 
propei·ty between different states and to and from foreign 
~ounti'ies. Such tax was held '\\rithout any dissent, to be a 
fogrtlation of interstate and foreign commerce, and, therefore, 
iiivalid. "\\Te do not qµestion the correctness of that decision, 
not do the vi~·ws ,ve hold in this case in any ,vay qualify or 
impHi 1· them." 
The decisive diffe1'¢rtce. between the Maine tax on the rail-
road and the Pennsylvania tax on the steamship line is that 
the Maine. fax was aj)portfoned to the mileage within the 
stat~ nud the Pennsvlvania tax was not. If the tax were not 
·so apportioned, more than one state could tax the same prop-
erty. Ji'or example, if 48 states imposed a 2% tax on total 
gross receipt~ of a transportation company, the taxes would 
~tcld np to 96% of its gross receipts and it could not operate. 
But jf each state measured its tax by the receipts properly 
apportioned to that state, all 48 taxes ,vould be based on only 
2 % of the carrier's total g_ross receipts. 
In ,Toseph v. Carter & 1,V eekes Stevedoring Company, 330 
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U. S. 422, 91 L .. Eel. 993 (1947), the tax on the gross receipts 
of the stevedoring company was not apportioned, and for 
that reason it was held unconstitutional. If it had been ap-
portioned it would have been held constitutional. 
page 127 ~ At page 427, the court said: 
'' This has arisen from long continued judicial interpre-
tation that, ,,ithout congressional action, the words them-
selve8 of the Commerce Clause forbid undue interferences 
hv the states with interstate commerce and that this rule 
applh~s in full force to an unapportioned tax on the gross pro-
ceeds from interstate business, where the taxes were not in 
lieu of ad valorem, taxes on property. 
''We do not think that a tax on gross income from steve-
doring, obviously a 'continuation of the transportation', is 
a tux apportioned to income derived from activities within the 
taxing state. 'I'he transportation in commerce, at the least, be-
gins with loading and ends with unloading. Loading and 
11nloading has effect on transportation outside the taxing state 
because those activities are not only preliminary to but are 
an essential part of the safety and convenience of the trans-
portation itself. 
'~ vVhen we come to weigh the burden or interference of this 
tax on the grosR receipts from interstate commerce, the pur-
poses of that portion of the Commerce Clause-the freeing 
of husiness from unneighborly regulations that inhibit the 
interc~ourse which supplies reciprocal wants by commerce-
is a signi:ticant factor for consideration. An interpretation of 
the text to leave the state free to tax comme.rce until Con-
gress intervened would have permitted intolerable .discrimi-
11ations. Nivpert v. Richm,ond, 327 U. S. 416, 90 L. Ed. 760, 
6t> S. Ct. 586, 162 A. L. H.. 844, and cases co1lected in notes 
rn, 14, 15 and 16. Nevertheless, a proper regard for the au-
thority of the states and their right to require interstate com-
merce to contribute by taxes to the support of the state gov-
ernment which make their interstate commerce possible, has 
led Congress, over a long period, to leave intact the jud-ic-ial 
rnlings, referred to above, that apportioned, non-discrimina-
tory gross receipt taxes or those fairly levied in lieu of prop-
erty taxes conformed to the requirements of the Commerce 
Ola nse." ( Italics added.) 
Among the "judicial rulings, referred to above" which 
the court says are still in full force and effect, is Maine v. 
(/ra,n(l 1'rit11.k. The court says that two kinds of gross receipts 
taxes are constitutional: (1) '' apportioned, non-discrimina-
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tory .gross receipts .taxes", and (2) "those fairly levied in 
lieu of property taxes". }Jxcept for poll taxes, every tax, 
in iina] analysis; is either a ptopetty tax or an excise tax. 
51 Am. J·ur., Taxation §§24, 81. And every property tax is 
either a Jump-sum tax or an ad valorem tax. The Virginia 
tax µuder consideration is fairly apportioned and is a prop-
erty tax on the going concern value of the steamship line. 
It is the only Virginia tax imposed on the going concern value. 
'l~he localities_ are forbidden to tax the going con-
}Jage 128 ~ cern value. It is the same khid of tax that was 
held constitntio11al in J.l!l aine v. Grand Trunk. 
In the stevedoring case, Black dissented without opii1ion, 
Douglas and R.ntleclge thong-ht the tax valid as to interstate 
co1111nerce but void as to foreign commetce, and Murphy 
thought the tax valid as to all commerce. 
1.,hns did all nine of the Justices reaffirm the Grand Trunk 
casn. 1.'he disagreement among them was over whether the 
stevedol'ihg tax was 01· was not apportioned. 
1-,he dissenti1ig Justices said (p. 437) : 
"No other State could tax ~he saine activity. The tax there-
fore is in its application nothiiig mote than a gross receipts 
tax appoi'tioned to reach only income dctived from activities 
within the taxing State." 
Tho maJority said (p. 429) : 
'• rrhe multiple burden on interstate transp_ortation from 
taxation of the gross receipts £rom stevedoring arises from 
the possibility of a similar tax for unloading." 
In Central Greyhoitnd Lines v. Mealey, 334 U. S. 653, 92 
L. ]~cl. 1633 (1948), the tax on gross receipts was ttnappor-
fint1f.tl and fol' that reason five of the Justices held it uncon-
stitutional. They also held that if it could be apportioned it 
was constitutional and remanded the case to the State court 
for decision under the State law as to whether it could be 
apportioned. The dissenting .Justices thought the law was 
constitutional. . Thus did all nine Justices again hold that a 
tax apportiohed in accordance with the Gra;n,d Trunk case was 
. valid. 
':tihe Central Gl'eyhoui1d Lines was a motor bus carrier, but 
the tax in question was not a "road tax". It was not a tax 
for the privilege .of using the highways. It was a tax on all 
pnhlic utilities. It was a tax "equal to two per centum of 
its gross income • .. • upon every utility doing business in 
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this state • • • in addition to anv and all other taxes and fees 
imposed by any other provisio:ii of law * • • . '' 
The following quotation from the court's opinion shows (1) 
that the stevedoring case, Joseph v. Carter ct W. Stevedoring 
( 1 o., held the tax void because it was not apportioned, ( 2) 
that an ap1wrtione£l tax is valid, and (3) that ap-
page 129 ~ portionment in accordance with the formula in 
· Maine v. Grand Trnnk is constitutional: 
"By its very nature an unapportioned gross receipts tax 
makes interstate transportation bear more than 'a fair share 
of the cost of the local government whose protection it en-
joys'. Id. at 253, 91 L. Ed. 272, 67 S. Ct. 274. The vice of such 
a tax is that-it lays' a direct burden upon every transaction in 
Linterstatel commerce by withholding, for the use of the State, 
a part of evei·y dollar received in such transactions'. Crew 
Levick v. Pennsylvania., 245 U. S. 292, 297, G2 L. Ed. 295, 299, 
:J8 S. C. l 26; see J. D . .Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 
a07, 311, 82 L. Ed. 1365, 1 ;J69, 58 S. Ct. 913, 117 A .. L. R. 
429; Free-man v. Hew-it, 329 U.S. 249, 91 L. Ed. 265, 67 S. Ct. 
274, S'upra.; "oser,h v. Ca·rter cf; JV. Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 
422, 91 L. Ed. 993, 67 S. Ct. 815. 
"However, while the New York courts have construed the 
statute as levying an unapportioned gross receipts tax on this 
transaetion, the entire tax need not fall. The tax may be 
'fairly apportioned' to the 'business done within the state by 
a fair method of apportionment'. TVestern Livestock v. Bu-
re.rm, of Ilevmme, 303 U. S. 250, 255, 82 L. Ed. 823, 827, 58 
S. Ut. 546. There is no dispute as to feasibility in appor-
tioniug this tax. On the record before us the tax may con-
stitutionally be sustained on the receipts from the transpor-
tation apportioned as to the mileage within the State. See . 
Ratterm,a;n, v. Tl' estern U. Teleg Co., 127 U. S. 411, 427, 428, 
H2 L. Ed. 229, 23H, 234, 8 S. Ct. 1127, 2 Inters. Com. 59. There 
is no question as to the fairness of the suggested method of 
apportionment. Compare Maine v. Cfrand Trnnk R. Co., 142 
U. S. 217, 3fi L. li]d. 994, 12 S. Ct. 121, 163, 3 Inters. Com. 807, 
supra, with New JerseJf Bell Televh. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes 
& Assessnient.c;, 280 U. S. 3:38, 7 4 L. Ed. 463, 50 S. Ct. 111 ; 
cf. lVallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 64 L. Ed. 782, 40 S. Ct. 435. 
Hoth appellant and appellee have indicated here that, as a 
matter of construction, the statute under consideration per- · 
mits su.ch apportionment, but that is a matter for the New 
York courts to determine. 
"The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.'' 
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In Centml Greyhou.nd Lines, an apportioned tax measuted 
hy gross receipts was upheld on the authority of Maine v. 
0-rantl 1.'runk, without considering whether the New York 
tux was a property tax or an excise tax. Some of the Jus-
tie<~s of the Supreme Court, from time to time, have taken 
the po8iiion that because the tax in Maine v. Gra11.d Trunk was 
really a property tax that case is not authority for upholding 
f~xci':'e taxes on gross receipts earned in interstate commerce, 
but no Justice of the Supreme Court has ever dissented from 
the view thu t a tax like the :Maine tax is constitutional. All 
agree that a tax on going concern value measured 
page 130 ~ by apporti~ned gross receipts is constitutional. 
And since the Virginia tax on steamship lines is 
patterned after the Maine tax it is equally constitutional. 
rrhc a1·gument over whether the Maine tax was a property 
tax or uu excise tax begins with Ga-lveston, Har1··isb1tr,g <t San 
Antmiio Ra.ilumv v. 1'exas, 210 U.S. 217, 52 L. Ed.1031 (1908). 
The l\foinc statute called the Maine tax an excise tax, but the 
'Court, after analyzing it i11 a way that brings out ~he simi-
larities between the l\faine tax and the Virginia tax, decided 
that it ,vas a property tax, and said: 
"'1.1he state must be allowed to tax the property, and to 
tax it at its actual value as a going concern.'' 
~Phe opinion was written by Mr. Justice Holmes2 and he 
annJy~ed the Maine tax as follo,vs (p. 226): 
''Ju lllafoe v. Grand T1'unk 1l. Co., supra, 'an annual excise 
tax for the privilege of exercising its franchise' was. levied 
upon everyone operating a railroad in the state, fixed by per-
-centages, varying up to a certain limit, upon the average 
gro~s receipts per mile multiplied by the number of miles 
within the state, when the road extended outside. This seems 
at first sight like a reaction from the Philadelphia & Southern 
]\foil Steamship Company Case. But it may not have been. 
The estimated gross receipts per mile may be said to have 
heen made a m~asure of the value of the property per mile. 
Tliat the effort of the state was to reach that value, and not 
to fasten on tiie receipts from transportation as· such, wa·s 
Hhowu by tl1e fact that the scheme of the statute was to estab-
lish a system. 'l,he buildings of the railroad and its lan9-s 
and fixtures outside of its right of way were to be taxed locally, 
as other property was taxed, and this excise with the local 
tax wc~re to be in lieu of all taxes. The language shows that 
the local tax was not expected to include the additional value 
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gained by the property being part ·of a going concern. That 
idea came in later. The excise was an attempt to reach that 
additional value. The two taxes together fairly may be called 
u commutation tax. See Ficklen v. Taxing District, 145 U. S. 
1~ 2~, 86 L. Ed. 601, 607, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 79, 12 Sup. Ct. 
Rep. 810; Postal Teleg. Gable Co. v . .Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 
697, 39 L. Ed. 311, 316, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
268,360; McHen,ry v . .Alford, 168 U.S. 651, 670, 671, 42 L. Ed. 
614, 621, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 242. 
"By whatever name the exaction may be called, if it 
amounts to no more than the ordinary tax upon property or 
a just equivalent therefor, ascertained by reference thereto, 
it is not open to attack as inconsistent with the Constitution.' 
Posta.Z- 1'eleg. Cable Co. v. Admns, supra. See New York, 
L.11. & lV. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U.S. 431,438, 39 L. Ed. 
104~, 1045, 1046, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 896. The question is whether 
this is such a tax. It appears sufficiently perhaps froin what 
lms been said, that we are to look for a practical rather than 
a logical or philosophical distinction. The state must be al-
lowed to tax the property, and to tax it at its 
page 131 ~ actual value as a going concem. '' 
So far as Virginia is concerned it makes no difference 
whetl1er the doctrine of the Grand Trunk case, as explained by 
.Mr. Justice Hohnes, sustains only taxes like the Maine tax 
or wl,ether it goes further than that. Either way, the Vir-
ginia taxes are valid so long as the Grand Trunk case is not 
overruled. The arguments over the scope of the Grand Trunk, 
decision are solely concerned with the question of whether it · 
goes fnrther than merely to uphold gross receipts taxes on 
going concern value, and upholds gross receipts taxes that 
a.re excise taxes in fact as well as in name. 
1n hderstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662, 93 
L. .Ed. 1613 (1949), the argument was over whether Justice 
Hohpcs 's explanation of the Grand Tnmk ease was correct, or 
,vl10t.her the scope of the Grand Trnnk decision went far 
enough to uphold an excise tax (as opposed to a tax on going 
concern value) on a pipe line company that did onlv interstate 
business. .. .. 
Rutledge, Black, Douglas and Murphy thought the Grand 
Trnnk case covered the pipe line case. 
Reed, Vinson, Frankfurter and Jackson thought it did not 
go that far. 
Rnrton thougllt the commerce in question was all intrastate, 
and iherefore had no occasion to express any views as to the 
scope of the Grand 'Trunk case. 
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.J nstice Rutledge's opinion says (p. 666): 
"The statute is not invalidated by the commerce clause of 
the Jf'edetal Constitution merely because, unlike the statute 
:attacked in Menip1iis Ncititral Ga.s Co. v. Stone (U. S.), sitpra, 
it imposes a 'direct' tax on the 'privilege' of engaging in in-
terstate commerce. Any notions to the contrary should not 
liave ~tii'vived JJ,faine v. • Gra.nd 1.'runk R. Co., 142 U. S. 217, 
B!J L. Ed. 994, .12 S. Ct. 121, 1.63, 3 Inte1•s. Com. 807, which flatly 
rules the case at bat." 
In footnote No. 7, he said: 
''Nothing in the Grand Trunk . opm10n suggests the ex-
J)lmrn 1:ion haza1~ded by Mr. Justice Holmes in Gal·veston; H. tt 
S. A.H. Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 226, 52 L. Ed. 1031, 1037, 
~8 H. Ct. G!-18, that the tax in the Grarld Trunk Case was sus-
tained on the ground that it was imposed in lieu 0£ ad valotem 
taxes.'' 
.. Tn~tice H.eed 's opinior1, iii footnote No. 18, referring to Gen· 
tral Greyhow,zd Li1tes v . .1.1:lealey, said: . 
page 132 ~ '' This decision f o~lowed a ptolonged contro· 
versy_ over the taxability of the proceeds of inter-
state <?oinmerce. Maine v. Grand Tn1,nk R. Co., 142 U. S. 217, 
35 L. l~<l. 994, l 2 S. Ct. 121, 163, 3 Inters. Com. 807, has been 
cited for the saine pi'oposition,.see e.g., J. D. Admns Mfg. Co. 
Y. Sto-ren, 804 u. s. 307, 329, 82 L. Ed.1365, 1378, 58 s. Ct. 913, 
117 A. L. R. 429, although there is in the report of the case, 
}), 218, §2 of the Act there in questio11, support for Mr. J us-
tice Holmes' treatment of it in Oalveston, ll. & 8 . .A.. R. Co. v. 
'I'e.ms, 210 U. S. 217, 226, 52 L. Ed. 1031, 1037, 28 S. Ct. 638, 
a~ a tax in lieu of ad valorein taxes." 
Tlms four of the Justices considered the scope of the Grand 
!I'tunk case broad enough to uphold an excise tax on the privi-
lege of ei1gaging in interstate commerce, and the four dissent-
ing ,Jnst_ices _ thought that ,Justice Holmes 's analysis of the 
Ora1ul 1.'runk case was correct; and that the Maine tax was 
'fl tnx on property the value of which ·was measured by gross 
recei.pts. t:r'he four dissenting ,Justices reaffitmed their con-
cmreuce in Central Greyhound Lines, saying (p. 681): 
"All interstate commerce thus has free access to local mar-
kets slibject only to nondiscriminatory taxes such as the tax 
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on apportioned gross receipts from intrastate mileage as in 
Central, Grei1hownd Lines v. Mealey * * * • " 
The ''intrastate mileage" they are referring to is the intra-
~tate part of interstate trips. The same apportionment 
formula was used in Maine v. Grand 1'ntnk that was used in 
Central Grevhoiind Lines and that is used in §58-575 of the 
Code of Virginia In Maine v. Grancl Trunk the formula was 
held constitutional in the case of railroads. In Central Grey-
h01md Lines the formula was held constitutional in the case 
of all public utilities. It i~ equally c.onstitutional in the case 
of stea~hip lines. , 
In Ott. v .. 11'/ississippi J7. allev Barge Line Co., 336 U. S. 169, 
~3 L. Ed. 585 (1949), the Supreme Co~urt, reversing the courts 
helow, for the first time held that property used for inter-
state transportation by water was taxable by a state to the 
same extent as property used for interstate transportation 
by land. At pag·e 174 the Court said: 
'' Vv e see no practical difference so far as either the Dne 
Process Clause or the Commerce Ulause is concerned whether 
it i~ vessels or railroad cars that are moving in interstate 
commerce. The problem under the Commerce Clause is to de-
termine 'what portion of an interstate organism may appro-
J)riately be attributed to each of the various states in which 
it functions.' e 8 • So far as due process is con-
page 133 ~ cerned the only question is whether the tax in 
practical operation has relation to opportunities, 
benefits, or protection conferred or afforded by the taxing 
State ., • • Those requirements are satisfied if the tax is 
fairly apportioned to the commerce carried on within the 
State. 
'' There is such an apportiomn~nt under the formula of the 
Pullman Case. Moreover, that tax, like taxes. on property, 
taxes on activities confined solely to the taxing State, or taxes 
,;n gross recr-ipts apportioned to the business ca,rried on there, 
has no cumulative effect caused by the interstate character of 
the business. Hence there is no risk of multiple taxation. 
},inally, there is no claim in this case that Louisiana's tax dis-
criminates against interstate commerce. It seems therefore 
to square with our decisions holding that interstate commerce 
can he made to pay its way by bearing a nondiscriminatory 
share of the tax burden which each State may impose on the 
activities or property within its borders • ~ ,ii We can see no 
reason which should put water transportation on a different 
constitutional footing than other interstate enterprises.'' 
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In support of the statement about apportioned taxes on 
gross receipts that I have underscored in the foregoing quota-
tion, the court, in footnote 5, cited Mavne v. Gr{l;}id Trunk. 
~rhe Louisiana tax in the Ott case was assessed on the mar-
ket value of the vessels, and the Virginia tax is assessed on 
the going concern value of the steamship line. Both are taxes 
on property measured by the value of the property appor-
tioned to the taxing state. In Louisiana the value of the prop-
erty was measured by its market pric-e. In Virginia the value 
of the prope11ty is measured by its gross receipts. The 
Supreme Court cited Maine v. Grand Trunk, involving· taxes · · 
on gross receipts, in support of its decision that the Louisiana 
tax was valid. 
Consequently, the argument in favor of the constitution-
ality of §58-575 of the Code of Virginia can be stated very 
briefly: iJ,Jaine v. Grwnd Trunk holds constitutional an ap-
portioned gross receipts tax involving land transportation. 
Utt v. Missis,qippi Valley holds that Maine v. Grand Trunk 
appHes to water transportation. 
~rlu~ Virginia tax is called a license tax but is actually a 
property tax. Virginia does not seek to exclude these v~ssels 
from its ports and does not demand payment of the tax as a 
condition precedent to the privilege of entering its ports. To 
quote again from the Ott case, the Virginia tax is 
page 134 } supported by the decisions of the Supreme Court 
of the United States holding: 
"that interstate commerce can be made to pay its way by bear,. 
ing a noncliscriminatory share of the tax· burden which each 
~tate may impose on the activities or property within its bor-
ders." · · 
In Ga·nton Railroad Company v. Rogan, 95 L. Ed. Adv. Ops. 
334, decided February 26, 1951, the Supreme Court of the 
United States said {p. 335): · 
'' Tho State of Maryland imposes on steam railroad com-
panies a franchise tax, measured by gross receipts, appor .. 
tioned to the length of their lines within the State.'' 
And at page 337 : 
"The objection to Maryland's tax on the ground that in-
terstate commerce is involved is not well taken. It is settled 
that a nondiscriminatory gross receipts tax on an interstate 
enterprise may be sustained if fairly apportioned to the busi-
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ncss done within the taxing state (s~e TV estern Live Stock v •. 
B11,rea.·u of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 255,. 82 L. Ed. 823, 827, 
58 S. Ct. 546, 115 A. L. R. 944) and not reachiug any activities 
carried on beyond the borders of the state. Where trausporta-
tion is concerned, an apportioument according to the mileage 
within the state is an approved method. Central Greyhound 
_Lines v. Mealey, 334 U. S. 653, 663, 92 L. Ed. 1633, 1641, 68 
S. Ct. 1260.'' 
Although the case involved a gross receipts tax on railroads, 
. the use by the court of the expression~ '' an iuterstate enter-
prise" and "where transportation is concerned" makes it 
clear that the holding is not limited to railroad lines but in-
_cludes steamship lines. 
. After the opinions in this case had been written, 
page 135 ~ the Supreme Court of the United States, on March 
26, 1951, handed down its decision in Spector 
]fotor Service, Inc., v. O'Cowno'I·. In that case, the court held 
that the imposition of the Connecticut tax on Spector was un~ 
constitutional because: 
l. The taxpayer was engaged exclusively in interstate com-
merce. 
2. The tax was an excise tax. 
::t The highest court of Connecticut said the tax was an ex-
cise ta-x_. 
The Supreme Court would have held the tax constitutional 
·if the taxpayer had done miy intrastate business, if the tax 
had been a property tax, or if the highest court of Connecticut 
ha~l said that the tax was a property tax. 
We have seen that the name by which the tax is called by 
the state legislature is immaterial. But the name by which 
·the tax is called by the state supreme court is binding on the 
Supreme Court of the United States; or almost binding. Both 
of these rules were stated without qualification in Dawson v. 
Kentticky Distilleries .• 255 U.S. 288,292, supra. Some Supr_eme 
Court Justices qualify the second rule to the extent of hold-
ing that the state court's classification of a state tax as a 
property ta; or an excise tax is not binding if the state court's 
decision is obviously fraudulent. Thus, in Interstate Oil Pipe 
Line v. StO'lie, 337 U. S. 662 at 671, the dissenting opinion 
said: 
''Mississippi's interpretation of the meaning of its statute 
is binding on- this Court." 
Commonwealth v. Baltimore Steam Packet Co. 47 
And qualified that statement in footnote 2 by saying: 
'' Ruch determination may be rejected only if a palpable 
evasion for avoiding a contrary ruling under federal law." 
The four dissenting Justices· in that case· were among the 
six Justices who joined in the majority opinion in the Spector 
case. And the majority in tlie Svector case placed great stress 
on the fact that the highest court of Co1inecticut said the tax 
was an excise. They almost treated the Connecticut court's 
opinion as an admission against interest. They said: 
page 136 ~ '' After full consideration and with knowledge 
that its statement would be made the basis of de-
terming the validity of the application of the tax under the 
Commerce Clause, that court said: * • •." 
They then quoted the Connecticut court's statement that the 
tax was an excise, and said : 
"The tax is not levied as compensation for the use of the 
highways or collecte·d in lieu of an ad valorem property tax. 
Those bases of taxation have been disclaimed by the highest 
~ourt of the taxing State." · 
The dissenting Justices said: 
" • • ti the tax is declared invalid simply because the State 
has verbally characterized it as a levy on the privilege of doing 
business within its borders. The Court concedes, or at least 
nppears to concede, that if the Connecticut legislature or 
highest court had described the tax as one for the use of 
highways or in lieu of an ad valorem property tax, Spector 
wonld have had to pay the same amount, calculated in the 
same way, as is sought to be collected here. In acknowledg-
ing this, the Court's own opinion totally refutes its protesta-
tion that the standard employed to strike down Connecticut's 
tax is more than a matter of labels.'' 
Since the Virginia taxes on the franchises of public service 
companies are property taxes and not excise taxes, both the 
majority and the minority opinions in the Spector case agree 
thflt they are constitutional. If a state court holds that a tax 
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is a property tax, and if that holding is not '' a palpable 
~vasion for avoiding a contrary ruling under federal law", 
the question debated in the Spector case does not arise. The 
Virginia taxes are not merely '' in lieu of'' property taxes ; 
they are property taxes. 
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COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. 
STAT:BJ CORPORATION COMMISSION. 
At Richmond, March 15, 1951. 
CASE NO. 10163 . 
..A})p.lication of Baltimore Steam Packet Company for review 
of the 1950 assessment of the tax on gross receipts. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia, by its Attorney General, 
having filed due notice of appeal in this case, 
IT IS ORDERED that the two exhibits filed with the Stipu~ 
la tion and agreed .Statement of Facts, lettered and discribed 
as follows, be certified and forwarded to the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, to be returned by the 
Clerk thereof to this Commission with the mandate of that 
Court: 
Exhibit Description 
A. Copies of Acts of the State of Maryland incorporating 
the Baltimore Steam Packet Company and extending 
and continuing its corporate existence. 
R Consolidated Certificate of Enrollment and License for 
six vessels of the Baltimore Steam Packet Company. 
A True Copy-Teste: 
N. W. ATKINSON, 
Clerk of the State Corporation Commission. 
Commonwealth v. Baltimore Steam Packet Co. 49 
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COl\fMON,VEALTH Olt, VIRGINIA. 
STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION. 
CERTIFICATE. 
Pnrsuant to an order entered herein on March 15, 1951, 
the exhibits listed therein are hereby certified to the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, to be returned by the Clerk 
thereof to this Commission with the mandate of that Court. 
It is further certified to the Supreme Court of Appeals that 
the foregoing transcript of the record in this proceeding, with 
the exhibits mentioned, contains all the facts upon which the 
action appealed from was based, together with all the evidence 
introduced before or considered by the Commission. 
\Vitness the signat~re of Ralph T. Catterall, Chairman of 
the State Corporation Commission, under its seal and attested 
by its Clerk this 11th day of April, 1951, at Richmond, Vir-
giniu. 
(Seal) 
~\ttest: 
RALPH T. CATTERALL, 
Chairman. 
N. "\V. ATKINSON, Clerk. 
CERTIFICATE. 
I, N. W. Atkinson, Clerk of the State Corporation Commis-
sion, certify that, within sixty days after the final order in 
this r.ase, the Attorney General of Virginia, for the Common-
·wealth of Virginia, filed with me a notice of appeal therein 
which had been delivered to opposing counsel and counsel for 
the Commission pursuant to the provisions of Section 13 of 
Rule 5 :1 of the Rules of Supreme Court of Appeals. 
Subscribed at Richmond, Virginia, April 11, 1951. 
N. VI. ATKINSON, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste: 
:M:. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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